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ARTICLES
The Promise and The Peril: Artificial
Intelligence
and Employment Discrimination
KEITH E. SONDERLING, BRADFORD J. KELLEY & LANCE CASIMIR*
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is undeniably transforming the
workplace, though many implications remain unknown. Employers increasingly rely on algorithms to determine who
gets interviewed, hired, promoted, developed, disciplined, or
fired. If appropriately designed and applied, AI promises to
help workers find their most rewarding jobs, match companies with their most valuable and productive employees, and
advance diversity, inclusion, and accessibility in the workplace. Notwithstanding its positive impacts, however, AI
poses new perils for employment discrimination, especially
when designed or used improperly.
This Article examines the interaction between AI and federal
employment antidiscrimination law. This Article explores
the legal landscape including responses taken at the federal
level, as well as state, local, and global legislation. Next, this

*
The Honorable Keith E. Sonderling is a Commissioner on the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Before joining the EEOC, he
served as the Acting Administrator and Deputy Administrator in the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”). Bradford J. Kelley is Chief
Counsel to Commissioner Sonderling. He previously served as a senior policy
advisor in WHD. Lance Casimir is an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Sonderling. The views and opinions set forth herein are the personal views or opinions
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views or opinions of the EEOC or
any Commissioner.

1

2

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

Article examines a few legislative proposals designed to further regulate AI as well as several non-legislative proposals.
In the absence of a comprehensive federal framework, this
Article outlines and advances a deregulatory approach to
using AI in the context of employment antidiscrimination
that will maintain and spur further innovation. Against the
backdrop of the deregulatory approach, this Article concludes by discussing best practices to guide employers in using AI for employment decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Companies have become increasingly reliant on artificial intelligence (“AI”) in the workplace at virtually all stages of the employment lifecycle, including recruitment, hiring, training, discipline,
evaluations, compensation, and even terminations.1 The use of AI in
the workplace is rapidly expanding and is being used in a wide variety of tasks in the human resources (“HR”) arena, including scanning and filtering resumes, chat bots that answer applicant questions
and schedule interviews, monitoring and reporting on productivity
and safety, automated video interviews to assess candidates, and
even algorithms that analyze employee data to predict an applicant’s
future success.2 According to recent studies, 83% of large employers
1

See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) (discussing the widespread uses of AI throughout
the employment lifecycle).
2
See id.; see also Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, The End of the Resume? Hiring is
in the Midst of a Technological Revolution with Algorithms, Chatbots, CHI. TRIB.
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surveyed in some form rely on AI in employment decision-making,
and 86% of employers that use AI claim that AI is becoming a mainstream technology at their company.3 AI, which operates through
learning algorithms and models, holds great promise for improved
employment decisions.
The potential uses and benefits of AI in the workplace are legion.
Advocates argue that AI speeds up the hiring process and eliminates
human bias and subjectivity.4 If AI is well designed and properly
deployed, it can help workers find their most rewarding jobs and
match companies with their most valuable and productive employees.5 Proponents further argue that AI systems can be more efficient
and thorough than human recruiters. Moreover, AI can enrich companies’ values and culture by eliminating unlawful discrimination
and thereby advancing diversity, equality of opportunity, accessibility, and inclusion in the workplace.6 Research has consistently
shown that AI tools used for employment decision-making often result in a greater diversity of hires, unbiased promotion decisions, and
better retention of employees through early detection of job dissatisfaction.7 Wearable technologies such as exoskeleton suits and robotic arms have been able to mitigate the effects of disabilities,
thereby broadening employment opportunities for disabled workers
(July 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-artificial-intelligence-hiring-20180719-story.html (noting the widespread use of web
crawlers that analyze a substantial amount of data to identify candidates who are
not actively job hunting).
3
Keith E. Sonderling, Do Robots Care About Your Civil Rights?, CHI. TRIB.,
https://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=285d3467-3dbe-49b1-810e-014aefee1a3e (last visited Sept.
1, 2022); see also Joe McKendrick, AI Adoption Skyrocketed Over the Last 18
Months, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 27, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/09/ai-adoptionskyrocketed-over-the-last-18-months.
4
See Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 2 (explaining that AI can reduce or eliminate
bias by masking names and other information).
5
Keith E. Sonderling, How People Analytics Can Prevent Algorithmic Bias,
INT’L ASS’N FOR HUM. RES. INFO. MGMT., https://www.ihrim.org/2021/12/howpeople-analytics-can-prevent-algorithmic-bias-by-commissioner-keith-e-sonderling/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).
6
See Kimberly A. Houser, Can AI Solve the Diversity Problem in the Tech
Industry? Mitigating Noise and Bias in Employment Decision-Making, 22 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 290, 351 (2019).
7
Id.
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while simultaneously preventing work-related accidents and improving productivity by reducing absences due to disability and illness.8 Notably, the use of these HR technologies dramatically accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic, and many companies are
significantly investing in AI.9
At the same time, using AI in employment decision-making triggers foreseeable risks concerning discrimination throughout the employment lifecycle. Employment discrimination may occur if a nefarious actor intentionally feeds the machine bad data that leads to
discrimination.10 Critics of AI in employment decisions routinely
point out that the systems relying on and controlled by human inputs
are only as good as those who “feed the machine.”11 Employment
discrimination can also arise if the unlawful biases or predilections
of the company’s hiring professionals are inherited or learned by the
AI tool.12 As a consequence, without proper vetting and analysis, AI
tools can possibly inject subjective bias into what is otherwise supposed to be an unbiased and objective process, and thereby expose
employers to liability.13
8

See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Applications and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for
Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21, 40–41 (2018) [hereinafter
Algorithms at Work] (explaining that exoskeletons are especially well-suited to
help those who move with restricted mobility because of paralysis or weakened
limbs by allowing people to move in a more sustained way or walk despite spinal
injuries).
9
See McKendrick, supra note 3 (noting surveys showing that up to 55% of
companies accelerated their AI adoption plans because of the COVID-19 pandemic and that 67% of companies expect to further accelerate their AI implementation strategy moving forward).
10
See William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 337, 354 (2020) (outlining an example of a firm or a rogue employee who
constructs a machine learning algorithm that appears unbiased but in fact encoded
certain biases to refrain from doing business with individuals of certain religions
or races).
11
Id. (noting that software engineers are the ones who have to make the hard
decisions about what data to use, how to structure the data, and how to interpret
it).
12
See id.
13
See Gary D. Friedman & Thomas McCarthy, A.I. in Hiring: Potential Pitfalls for Employers, WEIL (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.weil.com/articles/ai-inhiring-potential-pitfalls-for-employers.
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Significantly, the use of AI in employment decisions might run
afoul of federal employment antidiscrimination laws that prohibit
discrimination against individuals based on certain protected categories.14 Notably, the use of AI in employment decision-making implicates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), a
federal law that protects employees and applicants against discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.15 AI
tools, like tests and other selection tools or procedures, may violate
federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VII if they disproportionately screen out individuals in a protected class and if the employer
is unable to justify the exclusion as sufficiently job-related and consistent with business necessity.16 For example, an algorithm trained
to prefer employees within a certain commuting distance might result in applicants from certain areas being disadvantaged or excluded.17 If the result has a statistically significant disparate impact
on certain races or those from a particular national origin, and the
employer fails to demonstrate its geographic restriction is job-related and a business necessity, the employer will likely be liable under Title VII.18 Another illustration is a chatbot that screens out applicants with gaps in their employment history, which may disparately impact women who took time away from the workplace for
caregiving responsibilities.19
Moreover, the use of AI could also implicate the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which prohibits employers from discriminating in employment against certain persons with mental and
14

See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV.
519, 523–24 (2018).
15
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
16
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Jenny R. Yang, Adapting
Our Anti-Discrimination Laws to Protect Workers’ Rights in the Age of Algorithmic Employment Assessments and Evolving Workplace Technology, 35 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 207, 220–21 (2021).
17
See Yang, supra note 16, at 218.
18
See id. at 220–21.
19
See Caitlin Mullen, AI Use in Hiring Means Women with Employment
Gaps Get Overlooked, BIZWOMEN (Sept. 23, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2021/09/ai-hiringwomen-employment-gaps.html?page=all (citing a Harvard Business School report showing that almost half of companies automatically reject candidates with
resumes indicating an employment gap, typically of six months or more).
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physical disabilities.20 As an initial matter, some AI tools that require applicants to participate in a game-based assessment or take
personality tests may not be accessible to individuals with a disability, especially those with visual, auditory, or other impairments.21
Similarly, employers may violate the ADA if AI tools exclude or
result in lower scores or assessment results for individuals with disabilities. For instance, video software that excludes someone with a
vision disability because they did not make good eye contact may
violate the ADA.22 On a related note, an AI tool that screens out an
applicant who states that they cannot stand for thirty minutes, without allowing the applicant the opportunity to request a reasonable
accommodation also raises legal concerns.23 Further, an algorithm
might trigger the ADA if it discerns an applicant’s physical disability, mental health, or clinical diagnosis that is not otherwise obvious
or apparent.24 For example, an employer’s review of data indicating
a tremor could be considered a disability-related inquiry because a
tremor could reveal certain neurological afflictions such as cerebral
palsy or a stroke.25
Perhaps not surprisingly, the use of AI for employment purposes
has drawn the attention of federal regulators such as the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the federal

20

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213.
See generally Judy Greenwald, Regulators Target Disability Bias Risks in
AI Tools, BUS. INS. (May 24, 2022), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20220524/NEWS06/912350088/Regulators-target-disability-bias-risks-inAI-tools.
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (2021); Gary D.
Friedman & Thomas McCarthy, Employment Law Red Flags in the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Hiring, WEIL EMP. UPDATE 4 (Sept. 2020),
https://www.weil.com/~/media/mailings/2020/q3/employer-update_september2020.pdf (discussing the ADA concerns related to the use of AI in employment
decision-making).
25
See Garry Mathiason et al., The Transformation of the Workplace Through
Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Automation: Employment and Labor Law
Issues, Solutions, and the Legislative and Regulatory Response, LITTLER REPS.
16
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.littler.com/files/2016_wp_transformation_of_the_workplace_through_robotics_ai_and_automation_2.pdf.
21
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agency responsible for enforcing federal workplace antidiscrimination laws.26 In October of 2021, the EEOC launched an initiative to
ensure that the use of AI and other technology-driven tools utilized
in hiring and other employment decisions complies with federal antidiscrimination laws.27
The ability of AI to lead to discriminatory outcomes, especially
in ways that are not apparent or easily discernible, with related
known and unknown consequences, has led to responses across the
globe to implement greater oversight to prevent the misuse of AI in
employment.28 Overall, the United States has adopted a more decentralized approach to regulating AI in employment decisions, but recent developments in state and local laws may portend further regulation of AI on a more localized level.29 For instance, Illinois and
Maryland have enacted laws that impose requirements regarding
how employers may use AI, including facial recognition technologies, during the hiring process.30 Other countries and entities have
regulated AI with a heavier hand. For instance, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation includes non-discrimination requirements for algorithmic profiling and a right to obtain an
explanation of automated decisions that significantly affect users.31
26

See Paige Smith, Artificial Intelligence Bias Needs EEOC Oversight, Official Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 1, 2021, 12:18 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/artificial-intelligence-bias-needs-eeoc-oversight-official-says.
27
EEOC Launches Initiative on Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Fairness, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-launches-initiative-artificial-intelligenceand-algorithmic-fairness.
28
See Scott J. Shackelford & Rachel Dockery, Governing AI, 30 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279, 308–14 (2020).
29
See Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of Innovation:
A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 35 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 42–43 (2019) (explaining that “[f]rom a regulatory
perspective, the United States has assessed that any broad regulation of AI is inappropriate in the current stage of AI and machine learning.”).
30
See Danielle Moss et al., Medley Of State AI Laws Pose Employer Compliance Hurdles, LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2022, 3:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1477833/medley-of-state-ai-laws-pose-employercompliance-hurdles (discussing Illinois and Maryland laws as well as other AI
proposals).
31
See Shackelford & Dockery, supra note 28, at 308–09.

2022]

THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL

9

Even though the legal and regulatory landscape is still in its infancy, many private initiatives have embraced self-regulation to foster responsible AI development and deployment and to help prevent
AI tools from delivering biased results that could perpetuate or even
worsen unlawful employment discrimination.32 Indeed, it has become a common practice for major companies such as Google and
Microsoft to develop and publish their own AI principles or guidelines.33 Similarly, an increasing number of major corporate entities,
including Deloitte, Humana, and Walmart, have partnered to study
and identify best practices on AI technologies.34 Critically, these
companies have established their own principles governing the development and use of AI that purport to commit members of these
partnerships to actively engage with stakeholders to protect the privacy, security, and other human rights of individuals.35
The rapid development and steady implementation of AI has
also led to a growing number of proposals for increased oversight,
including measures regulating the use of AI in the employment context.36 For example, in 2022, the California Fair Employment and
Housing Council proposed sweeping modifications to the state’s
employment antidiscrimination laws that would significantly expand potential liability for employers and third-party vendors that
use, sell, or administer AI tools in connection with employment decision-making.37 Similar measures are being considered on the
global stage. Most notably, in 2021, the European Commission unveiled a far-reaching AI proposal that would cover providers and
32

Id. (explaining that these private initiatives involve the private sector, academia, civil society, and partnerships between these various components); see
also Kristen E. Egger, Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace: Exploring Liability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Regulatory Solutions, 60
WASHBURN L.J. 527, 556–57 (2021).
33
See Egger, supra note 32, at 556–57.
34
See Steve Lohr, Group Backed by Top Companies Moves to Combat A.I.
Bias in Hiring, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2021).
35
See id.
36
See Danielle Ochs et al., California’s Draft Regulations Spotlight Artificial
Intelligence Tools’ Potential to Lead to Discrimination Claims, OGLETREE
DEAKINS (May 13, 2022), https://ogletree.com/insights/californias-draft-regulations-spotlight-artificial-intelligence-tools-potential-to-lead-to-discriminationclaims/.
37
See id.
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vendors of AI systems, imposing new legal obligations and establishing a regime to monitor and enforce compliance, with authority
to adjudicate violations and impose substantial penalties on violators.38 Meanwhile, some commentators have focused on innovative
and forward-thinking non-legislative proposals. For instance, some
have argued that companies should look to the model risk management framework that corporations in the financial sector have successfully implemented for over a decade.39 Proponents of this framework contend that companies and developers can effectively manage the risks associated with AI by using established processes derived from lessons learned in the financial industry and that have
endured testing and time.40
Even if the United States were to implement an overarching legislative and regulatory framework, which is unlikely, it should be
structured to not only allow but also encourage and incentivize innovation that will further advance the capabilities of AI and related
technologies. At the same time, any such framework must confront
and help eliminate associated risks. Unless and until an AI-focused
regime is in place, however, AI remains subject to existing laws,
most of which were enacted decades ago when such programs were
mere science fiction. For example, the federal antidiscrimination
statutes that the EEOC administers and enforces apply with equal
force to decisions made by algorithms as they do to decisions made
by individuals, and several—such as Title VII—were enacted more
than half a century ago.41
Within this framework, federal agencies must do more. First,
federal agencies should fully utilize the tools they already have at
their disposal. For instance, the EEOC should consider using Commissioner charges and directed investigations to address AI-related
employment discrimination that would allow EEOC leadership to
initiate focused bias probes.42 Second, federal agencies such as the
38
See Heather Sussman et al., The New EU Approach to the Regulation of
Artificial Intelligence, ORRICK (May 7, 2021) https://www.orrick.com/en/Insights/2021/05/The-New-EU-Approach-to-the-Regulation-of-ArtificialIntelligence (describing the European Commission’s proposal).
39
See David M. Skanderson, Managing Discrimination Risk of Machine
Learning and AI Models, 35 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 339, 345 (2021).
40
Id. at 356, 358–59.
41
See Sonderling, supra note 5; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
42
See Smith, supra note 26.
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EEOC should encourage and incentivize companies to create voluntary compliance programs so that employers can reliably determine
and ensure they comply with legal and ethical obligations. Third,
federal agencies, such as the EEOC, should provide frequent and
consistent guidance to clarify the law and help encourage technology vendors and employers to be proactive in preventing discriminatory effects. Equally important, more comprehensive, reasonable,
and stable guidance has the potential to reduce uncertainty, protect
workers and applicants, and direct employers—all without stifling
innovation.43
The current lack of comprehensive and consistent AI regulation
makes developing and adopting best practices even more important
to boost public confidence in AI technologies while supporting the
widespread use of AI in the workplace. Fortunately, practitioners
and industry experts have already begun this work, having identified
ways for employers to better comply with federal antidiscrimination
law and mitigate AI-related risks.44 For instance, companies must
understand both the substance and origin of data used to train and
operate AI used for employment decision-making.45 Furthermore,
companies should be transparent and clearly explain how they use
AI, which will foster trust, credibility, and, as a result, a greater appreciation of the merits of AI systems.46 Even when using AI
properly, the absence of transparency, accountability, and understandability will likely undermine the benefits of its use. Moreover,
employers should monitor and audit AI uses and processes to pro-

43

See Fresh SHRM Research Explores Use of Automation and AI in HR,
SHRM (Apr. 13, 2022), https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/press-room/press-releases/pages/fresh-shrm-research-explores-use-of-automation-and-ai-in-hr.aspx
(discussing study finding that nearly 9 out of 10 employers using AI tools are
seeking guidance on the use and lawful implementation of AI in various applications). The consistent application of legal principles is another vital feature for
guidance.
44
See Moss et al., supra note 30.
45
See id.
46
See id.
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actively identify intentional misuse or potential discriminatory outcomes.47 Finally, and some argue more critically, employers must
discern the point at which humans must be involved in the employment decision-making process. Other considerations for employers
to consider as well as understand are vendor liability and continued
situational awareness of AI legislation and litigation.48
This Article examines the interaction between the use of AI technologies in employment decision-making and federal employment
antidiscrimination law. Part I of this Article explores how employers
use AI in employment decision-making, including its significant and
widespread benefits. Next, Part II examines the discrimination-related pitfalls of AI with respect to applicable federal employment
antidiscrimination laws and related regulatory and subregulatory
guidance. Against this backdrop, Part III explores the responses to
the rise of AI in the workplace, with a particular focus on the steady
growth of AI laws at the state and local levels and responses on the
global stage. Part III also examines the increasingly vital role that
self-regulation must play within the private sector. Part IV discusses
a number of regulatory proposals that have been considered in recent
years, including international proposals that are illustrative examples of how the United States may proceed. Part V outlines and advocates for a deregulatory approach to using AI in the context of
equal employment opportunity laws that accounts for technology’s
benefits, related risks, and potential barriers to innovation. More
specifically, this Part contends that existing laws are an invaluable
tool that can be used to combat unlawful discrimination in their current form. This Part also argues that voluntary compliance should be
encouraged and incentivized, and that it is imperative for federal
agencies to issue more guidance. Finally, as part of the deregulatory
approach, Part VI then provides best practices that employers should
consider for mitigating AI-related risks.

See Houser, supra note 6, at 344 (“[A] responsible AI program to reduce
bias in employment decisions will start with the careful consideration of the design of the algorithms, the ongoing monitoring and correcting of data, and the
auditing of outcomes for potential discriminatory results.”).
48
Id.
47
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I. OVERVIEW OF AI AND ITS BENEFITS
This Part provides a brief overview of AI, including how it is
defined and most frequently used at various stages of the employment lifecycle. Next, this Part briefly discusses the important role
that AI vendors play. This Part also explores the many benefits of
AI in the workplace. Finally, this Part examines the widespread impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment-related AI.
A. AI Defined and its Uses
Although the precise definition of AI is fluid and inexact, AI can
be best understood as a set of techniques aimed at approximating
some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines.49 Generally speaking, AI refers to systems that use data and computational
techniques either to make decisions or to assist people in making
them.50 AI tools use large amounts of data to detect patterns, and
then use those patterns to predict outcomes in new situations.51
There are many different forms of AI but the two most relevant
to the use of AI in employment decision-making are machine learning and natural language processing.52 Machine learning is a subset
of AI that involves AI systems that show improved performance as
they are provided with more data and as they predict more outcomes.53 In other words, these systems become increasingly intelligent over a given period and through more extensive use. Natural
language processing is the branch of AI concerned with giving computers the ability to understand text and spoken words in much of
the same way humans can.54

49

Id. at 294.
See Pauline T. Kim & Matthew T. Bodie, Artificial Intelligence and the
Challenges of Workplace Discrimination and Privacy, 35 A.B.A J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 289, 290 (2021) (explaining that AI “loosely refer[s] to systems that leverage
data-rich inputs and computational techniques to make predictions that either aid
or replace human decision-making”).
51
Id.
52
Paul Bergeron, How to Avoid Discrimination When Using AI, SHRM
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/technology/pages/how-to-avoid-discrimination-when-using-ai.aspx.
53
Id.
54
Id.
50
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AI technologies generally exist within several relatively distinct
stages of the recruitment and hiring process: job descriptions, sourcing, screening, interviewing, and selection.55 During the recruiting
stage, employers seek candidates to apply for jobs through general
and targeted advertisements, job postings, and engagement.56 Next,
in the screening stage, the employer assesses candidates by analyzing their skills, experience, and personality attributes as described
on resumes and applications.57 Some systems use AI to screen and
rank candidates while others use online games. Then, during the interviewing stage, employers conduct video interviews of applicants
and apply AI to analyze and assess them.58 These video tools often
have the capability of analyzing factors such as facial expression,
eye contact, and word choice in its machine learning. Finally, in the
selection stage, AI sometimes makes final hiring and, even, compensation decisions.59 The selection stage also involves the use of
AI in areas like pre-employment background checks.60
The use of AI in the employment arena is rapidly expanding past
traditional HR functions, including scanning and filtering resumes,
analyzing job candidates’ social media presence, evaluating candidates’ skills to identify top candidates, scheduling interviews, and

55

See Miranda Bogen & Aaron Rieke, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, Equity, and Bias, UPTURN 13, 55 n.89 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring-algorithms/files/Upturn%20-%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf (explaining that these stages “are not universally defined, but reflect common usage and practice within the talent acquisition industry and common perceptions of the hiring process among job seekers”).
56
See id. at 13. For example, ZipRecruiter operates within this sourcing stage
by filtering jobs based on previous applications and on-site activity by the applicant. See id. at 21. Similarly, LinkedIn returns a list of individuals ranked by their
“likelihood to be hired” based on an individual’s current job status, pages followed, and how likely the individual will respond to a recruiter’s message. See id.
at 24.
57
Id. at 13.
58
See id. at 36.
59
See id. at 39.
60
Id. Pre-employment background checks are commonly used to determine
if an applicant has a criminal history or is authorized to work. Id.
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answering candidates’ questions via chatbots.61 Some companies
have applicants play neuroscience computer games, which are then
analyzed to predict candidates’ cognitive and personality traits.62
One technology company, for instance, has used voice and facial
recognition and analysis software to examine a candidate’s body
language, tone, and other factors during recorded interviews to determine whether the candidate exhibits preferred traits.63
In addition, employers are increasingly using AI to manage performance. Employers are using AI systems to track both on-site and
remote workers by following employee log-in times, overall computer usage, and online activities to evaluate their employees’ performance and efficiency.64 AI tools can also monitor whether employees are paying attention to their computer screens using
webcams and eye-tracking software while surveilling websites and
applications that employees use.65 Employees who do not meet
specified performance metrics may also be subject to formal discipline, including termination, based on the recommendation of AI algorithms.66
B. The Role of Vendors
In most situations, employers engage third-party vendors that offer AI-powered algorithms to perform HR tasks.67 In brief, vendors
61

Elizabeth McLean, How to Use AI Responsibly in Hiring, RECRUITING
DAILY (Mar. 17, 2022), https://recruitingdaily.com/how-to-use-ai-responsibly-inhiring/.
62
Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24.
63
Id.
64
See Michelle Capezza, Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace and The Future of Employer-Provided Employee Benefits, NYU REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS AND
EXEC. COMP. (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.mintz.com/sites/default/files/media/documents/2021-10-01/Artificial%20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Workplace%20and%20The%20Future%20of%20Employer-Provided%20Employee%20Benefits.pdf.
65
Id.
66
Joseph C. O’Keefe et al., Artificial Intelligence: Employment Law Risks
and Considerations, in GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS AI, MACHINE LEARNING & BIG
DATA 35, 36 (Matt Berkowitz & Emma Maconick eds., 3rd ed., 2021).
67
Adam S. Forman & Nathaniel M. Glasser, Hiring by Algorithm: Legal Issues Presented by the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Sourcing and Selection,
EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN: WORKFORCE BULLETIN (Mar. 17, 2021),
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are the entities that develop AI systems and place them in the market
or that develop the system and put it to use for themselves.68 Under
the current legal framework in the United States, employers—not
vendors—are generally liable for employment discrimination.69 Experts have explained that the law protects AI developers from liability so long as the vendor can demonstrate that it was “designed for
a particular purpose and was reasonably accurate and effective in
accomplishing that purpose.”70 One practitioner has explained that,
regardless of the AI tool, because the employer makes the hiring
decision, the employer cannot credibly argue that its software company is responsible for the employer’s actions.71 Delegating employment decisions to AI will no more insulate an employer from a
discriminatory or otherwise unlawful employment decision than assigning the task to supervisors or other management employees.72 In
both cases, the employer is liable.
C. The Benefits of AI
Despite its Orwellian overtones, the benefits of using AI in the
workplace are vast. AI tools help recruiters and HR departments
quickly sift through significant numbers of applications and more
efficiently identify qualified candidates at the start of the hiring process.73 After all, manually screening resumes from a large applicant

https://www.workforcebulletin.com/2021/03/17/hiring-by-algorithm-legal-issues-presented-by-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-sourcing-and-selection/.
68
See id.
69
See Yavar Bathaee, Artificial Intelligence Opinion Liability, 35 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 113, 148–49 (2020) [hereinafter AI Opinion Liability] (explaining that
AI that discriminates based on gender because of biases in the data used to train
it will likely not result in liability for the company that created the AI, mainly
because there is no evidence of scienter or even negligence).
70
See id.; see also Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and
the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 919 (2018).
71
See Anne Cullen, 5 Tips For Curbing Bias Risk When Using AI For Hiring,
LAW360 (Jan. 20, 2021, 7:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1346883/5-tips-for-curbing-bias-risk-when-using-ai-for-hiring.
72
Id.
73
See Skanderson, supra note 39, at 345.
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pool is a very time-consuming process.74 For example, in 2021, Amazon hosted a recruiting event and one million people applied for
job openings.75 AI can help HR professionals identify the strongest
candidates for a job.76 Research confirms that AI tools in the area of
employment decision-making result in a greater diversity of hires,
fairer promotion decisions, and better retention of employees
through early detection of unhappiness.77
Research has shown that AI can remove bias in employment decisions, and therefore help ensure more equality in recruitment and
hiring.78 Some companies that have used AI in recruitment have
confirmed greater success in increasing the diversity of their candidates.79 AI can also analyze the success of job advertisements and
help provide a better first impression of a company.80 Through data
analysis, employers can learn how to better draft language for job
advertisements that is more likely to attract a diverse applicant
pool.81

74

See Kelly Trindel et al., Fairness in Algorithmic Employment Selection:
How to Comply with Title VII, 35 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 241 (2021).
75
See Aimee Picchi, Amazon Says 1 Million Workers Applied for Jobs this
Week,
CBS
NEWS
(Sept.
17,
2021,
2:20
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-job-applications-1-million/.
76
Trindel et al., supra note 74, at 241–43 (stating that AI can help employers
hire the best and brightest candidates to increase their organization’s productivity
and competitive advantage while also complying with antidiscrimination laws).
77
Houser, supra note 6, at 351.
78
See Kimberly A. Houser, Artificial Intelligence and the Struggle Between
Good and Evil, 60 WASHBURN L.J. 475, 486 (2021).
79
Id. The author explains that AI has been shown to successfully increase the
demographic diversity of candidate pools by displaying biographical information
only after the candidates have passed a skills test. See id. at 487. In addition, several recruiting platforms are able to anonymize candidates by removing all indication of gender or race from applications. Id. AI can assist with creating uniform
hiring and promotion criteria, reducing the “likelihood of bias creeping into the
selection process.” Id.
80
Alex Tebbs, How AI Can Benefit the Employee Experience, HRZONE
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.hrzone.com/lead/future/how-ai-can-benefit-theemployee-experience.
81
See Kim, supra note 1, at 872 (noting an example of a job posting using
military analogies like “mission critical” that might reduce the number of women
who apply).
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From a business efficiency and employee experience perspective, AI can be especially beneficial during the onboarding process.
Onboarding is a critical period for new employees because it is during this time that they form their initial opinions about the company’s culture and their colleagues—opinions that frequently are cemented in a short period of time and thereafter are difficult to
change.82 Even more important, during the onboarding period, the
employees will assess and reach conclusions regarding their future
with the company.83 AI can help automate manual tasks by overseeing the completion of paperwork, identifying relevant resources, and
answering basic questions that are common for new employees.84
Furthermore, AI can generate insights into applicants and employees that human beings have greater difficulty recognizing.85 Regarding the ongoing training of employees, AI can shed light on
when, where, and how groups of, or even individual, employees
learn and develop the most, allowing employers to tailor trainings,
programs, and other offerings to best achieve their objectives.86 After employees complete a training program, AI can identify areas of
success and target aspects in need of improvement.87 AI can also
help employers ensure that they are not overlooking employees who
should be rewarded with greater roles and responsibilities, thus helping employees’ career growth and development.88 In addition to individual feedback, AI can perform these evaluations on a department or company-wide level.89

82

See Tebbs, supra note 80.
Id.
84
Id.
85
See Kim & Bodie, supra note 50, at 290.
86
Tebbs, supra note 80 (“Using machine learning, AI can give you insights
on when, where, and how your employees learn and develop the most.”).
87
Id.
88
See Lin Grensing-Pophal, The Role of AI in Retaining Top Talent, SHRM
(July 4, 2022), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/technology/pages/the-role-of-ai-in-retaining-top-talent.aspx (explaining how employees
are usually more loyal to their companies when they are given opportunities for
career growth).
89
Tebbs, supra note 80.
83
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Moreover, AI has a promising role to play in the retention of
employees and other workers. Data analysis can help employers recognize which employees are more likely to leave the company and
when.90 Relevant factors may include the amount of time an employee interacts with colleagues, meeting attendance, and the waiver
of benefits coverage.91 By analyzing this data, employers can focus
more on employee engagement and make strides in improving retention.92 In a similar vein, AI technologies that allocate work effectively and efficiently have been shown to minimize the potential of
employee burnout.93
In addition, workplace technologies and tools could provide remarkable opportunities for individuals with disabilities. Title I of the
ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating in employment against qualified persons with physical and mental disabilities.94 Robotic arms, exoskeleton suits, and other wearable technologies have been shown to supplement mobility and muscle function
and potentially mitigate certain disabilities.95 These technologies expand employment opportunities for disabled workers by broadening
the universe of positions for which disabled individuals are qualified.96 Equally impressive, these AI technologies simultaneously reduce the number of work-related ailments and absences due to illness and disability, thus also improving productivity.97

90

Kim & Bodie, supra note 50, at 292.
Id.
92
Id.
93
See Grensing-Pophal, supra note 88 (noting that AI software can identify
burnout among key employees before it reaches a breaking point).
94
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title I of the ADA is enforced by the EEOC and
prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees from discriminating against
a qualified individual with a disability. Id. An individual with a disability is defined as someone who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
95
See Algorithms at Work, supra note 8, at 40–41 (explaining that exoskeletons are especially well-suited to help those who have restricted mobility because
of paralysis or weakened limbs by allowing people to move in a more sustained
way or walk despite spinal injuries).
96
Mathiason et al., supra note 25, at 12.
97
See Algorithms at Work, supra note 8, at 40–41.
91
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AI tools could also highly benefit disabled workers by allowing
greater reasonable accommodation opportunities. The ADA requires covered employers to make reasonable accommodations to
the needs of qualified disabled applicants and employees, as long as
the accommodation does not result in undue hardship to the employer’s operations.98 For example, advanced sensory technology
could increase meaningful opportunities for deaf and blind applicants.99 Some new technologies such as Honda’s Asimo, can assist
an individual confined to a bed or a wheelchair perform critical manual operations such as turning on a light switch and opening
doors.100
D. The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on AI
AI’s benefits have become even more apparent during the
COVID-19 pandemic and have demonstrated that companies can
transform their workplaces by introducing AI faster than previously
anticipated.101 The COVID-19 pandemic impacted not only how
people work but also how companies hire.102 To a great degree,
COVID-19 accelerated the nationwide movement toward workfrom-home arrangements, which, in turn, hastened the adoption of
AI tools in the hiring process.103 For example, in 2018, 60% of companies used video interviews; this percentage sharply increased in
2020 as a result of global shutdowns and closures induced by the
COVID-19 pandemic.104 Not surprisingly, a 2020 survey found that
86% of respondents used virtual interview technology to enhance
remote hiring.105
98

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Mathiason et al., supra note 25, at 9.
100
Id.
101
See Capezza, supra note 64, at 7-2.
102
Keith E. Sonderling, Is Artificial Intelligence Ready for the Great Rehiring?,
WORLD ECON. F. (July
29,
2021),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/07/is-ai-ready-for-the-great-rehiring/.
103
See id.
104
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Automated Video Interviewing as the New Phrenology, 36
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 101, 108 (2022) [hereinafter Automated Video Interviewing].
105
Gartner HR Survey Shows 86% of Organizations Are Conducting Virtual
Interviews to Hire Candidates During Coronavirus Pandemic, GARTNER (Apr.
99
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COVID-19 also caused a significant number of employers to use
workplace AI tools to help with recruiting, hiring, and remote working so they could continue maintaining social distancing.106 Furthermore, the pandemic has significantly increased the prevalence of AI
used for video interviews, online candidate assessments, and decision-making.107 One commentator noted that AI-based solutions
helped employers manage furloughs and layoffs during the pandemic.108 AI has also been instrumental in alleviating the skills
shortages in the workforce, especially for industries hit hard by government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.109 Ultimately, AIenabled employment decision programs, especially pertaining to
hiring, have the potential to be a valuable part of the global recovery
from COVID.
II. THE LEGAL PERILS OF AI WITH EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
Despite the widespread benefits of AI in the workplace, employers necessarily take on certain risks when they apply these technologies. This Part provides a brief overview of some of the most significant legal risks associated with applying AI in employment decision-making. Fully exploring every legal risk and applicable law

30, 2020), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-release/2020-04-30gartner-hr-survey-shows-86--of-organizations-are-cond.
106
Adam S. Forman et al., Insight: Covid-19 May Push More Companies to
Use AI as Hiring Tool, BLOOMBERG L. (May 1, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-covid-19-may-pushmore-companies-to-use-ai-as-hiring-tool.
107
Id.
108
Tom Starner, How AI is Transforming Talent Acquisition During COVID,
HUM. RES. EXEC. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://hrexecutive.com/how-ai-is-transforming-talent-acquisition-during-covid/.
109
See McKendrick, supra note 3. See also Cortnie Abercrombie, Automation.
Big Brother. Drones. Terminator. Why do Businesses Want AI so Much? What
are they using it for? The Answer Might Surprise you., MEDIUM (Feb. 17, 2019),
https://medium.datadriveninvestor.com/big-brother-drones-terminator-what-arebusinesses-using-ai-for-the-answer-might-surprise-you-a87b21fa5685 (arguing
that the talent shortage in the hiring pipeline and the simultaneous mass retirements of experienced employees have been the key reasons more businesses are
adopting AI).
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or regulation is beyond the scope of this Article, but a general discussion and some key examples are both illustrative and illuminating.
A. The Perils in a Nutshell
The principal risk of incorporating AI in employment decisionmaking is the potential for discriminatory outcomes.110 One scholar
pointed out that “[a]ddressing algorithmic bias can present a
‘whack-a-mole’ problem, where the new algorithm—re-engineered
to have less negative impact on members of one protected group—
now has an increased adverse impact on another protected group.”111
Critics of AI in recruiting point out that the systems are only as good
as those who “feed the machine.”112 Put another way, the reliability
and lawfulness of the AI’s output is only as good as the inputs, designs, and users. For instance, some critics contend that if an AI tool
evaluates the resumes of previously selected candidates, the tool
could simply learn and repeat a company’s past discriminatory biases and preferences.113
Another criticism that legal commentators frequently raise when
discussing algorithmic selection tools is the “black box” problem,
which results from the difficulty, or impossibility, of explaining why
AI tools produced a particular outcome.114 This problem stems from
the concern that if AI outcomes cannot be explained, there might be
unknown biases underlying the outcomes.115

110

Houser, supra note 6, at 333.
Kelly Cahill Timmons, Pre-Employment Personality Tests, Algorithmic
Bias, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. 389, 445
(2021).
112
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 354.
113
Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24.
114
See Matthew U. Scherer et al., Applying Old Rules to New Tools: Employment Discrimination Law in the Age of Algorithms, 71 S.C. L. REV. 449, 492
(2019).
115
See Houser, supra note 6, at 340.
111
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B. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Federal law recognizes two theories to allege employment discrimination— disparate treatment and disparate impact—and AI implicates both.116 When an employer fails to hire, discharges, or otherwise discriminates with respect to an individual’s compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of” a protected characteristic, the employer engages in unlawful disparate
treatment, or intentional discrimination.117 Disparate treatment can
also arise with respect to AI when automated systems “learn” from
biased training data to recognize and discriminate against protected
characteristics without being explicitly programmed to do so.118 One
of the greatest legal risks for employers using AI for employment
decisions is that the AI technologies, by their very design, provide
decision-makers with notice of protected characteristics that otherwise would not have been known to the employer.119 This, in turn,
increases the likelihood that employers will make employment decisions because of, or even simply motivated by, those protected
characteristics—or, at a minimum, opens the door to credible allegations of discrimination.120
Even if an employer’s use of an algorithm is not intentionally
discriminatory, the employer may be liable.121 Under the disparate
impact theory of discrimination, plaintiffs may prove discrimination
without proving intent to discriminate if an employment policy or
practice disproportionately affects a protected group.122 In disparate
116

See Thomas B. Nachbar, Algorithmic Fairness, Algorithmic Discrimination, 48 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 530 (2021).
117
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
118
Matt Scherer & Ridhi Shetty, NY City Council Rams Through Once-Promising but Deeply Flawed Bill on AI Hiring Tools, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
(Nov. 12, 2021), https://cdt.org/insights/ny-city-council-rams-through-oncepromising-but-deeply-flawed-bill-on-ai-hiring-tools/.
119
See Lauren Daming, Employers Must Heed Range of Legal Issues Posed
by AI, LAW360 (May 31, 2022, 2:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/employmentauthority/articles/1497920/employers-must-heed-range-of-legal-issues-posedby-ai.
120
See id.
121
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Nachbar, supra note 116, at
514.
122
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (setting out the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases under Title VII).
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impact cases, once a plaintiff demonstrates that a policy or practice
has a disproportionately harmful effect on a protected class, the employer must show both that the policy or practice is “job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”123
Employers have long “faced considerable uncertainty in navigating
the legality of employment selection procedures in the context of the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII.”124
The risk of disparate impact claims is magnified when using AI
tools. In analyzing a large quantity of data, an algorithm might identify a statistical correlation between a specific characteristic of a job
applicant and future job success that nevertheless lacks a causal relationship.125 Furthermore, employees and applicants also may have
an easier path alleging class-wide discrimination claims if the employer uses the same AI tool or algorithm to assess an entire pool of
candidates. Put differently, if an algorithm is applied across a
group—or several groups—of applicants, the algorithm may easily
provide the common questions of law or fact necessary to certify a
class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.126
C. Talent Acquisition Risks
A host of legal issues often arise during the sourcing and talent
acquisition stage, the period when employers actively seek or solicit
candidates. Employers frequently use AI in job descriptions, advertising, matching, and individual outreach during this period.127

123

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Disparate impact is also available under the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6), and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 624(a)(1)–(2). The plaintiff’s claims are usually
supported by statistical comparison, which the defendant employer can challenge.
124
Trindel et al., supra note 74, at 285.
125
Kim, supra note 1, at 874–75 (discussing how statistical correlations may
be “entirely coincidental”). As a result, the employer may be unable to demonstrate that a practice with a disparate impact on a protected class of individuals is
sufficiently “job related or consistent with business necessity” as is required to
defend a claim under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
126
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
352 (2011).
127
See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 55, at 13.
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1. JOB ADVERTISING
Sourcing often triggers Title VII concerns. Many third-party
companies enable employers to target specific audiences with advertising, using both criteria the advertiser has established and the
platform’s algorithms to determine who sees specific advertisements.128 However, Title VII specifically prohibits limiting, segregating, or classifying employees according to any protected characteristic when the action would deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect their employment.129 Moreover, Title VII prohibits employers from categorizing job applicants
using discriminatory criteria, including in job advertisements.130 It
precludes employers from publishing job advertisements that indicate a “preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination”
based on a protected characteristic.131
ADA concerns are also implicated when AI sourcing is used in
the hiring process.132 The ADA specifically bans preemployment assessments, including qualification standards and employment tests,
that tend to screen out an individual with a disability or class of individuals with disabilities unless the test is shown to be job-related
and consistent with business necessity.133 The ADA prohibits employers from inquiring into an applicant’s disability during pre-employment procedures. Accordingly, AI used during the hiring process will likely violate the ADA if an algorithm unnecessarily discerns an applicant’s physical disability, mental disability, or clinical
diagnosis; all of which are forbidden inquiries in pre-employment

128

See id. at 17–18.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
130
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b).
131
Id. However, Title VII does state that employer notices or advertisements
“may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on
religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification for employment.” Id.
132
See Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4. See generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2). Major life activities may include “caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
133
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
129
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candidate assessments.134 Importantly, the ADA was amended in
2008 and the statutory definition of “disability” was significantly
expanded; this amendment increased the coverage of individuals the
ADA protects.135 Similarly, the EEOC has issued guidance qualifying the expanded list of personality disorders identified in the psychiatric literature as protected mental impairments.136 Consequently, the ADA may therefore protect applicants who have significant concentration or communication challenges, both of which AI
technology may identify as a disqualifying characteristic for employment.
Vendors of personality tests admittedly recognize the potential
for algorithmic bias.137 They claim to address this potential for bias
based on Title VII’s protected traits by auditing and correcting their
own algorithms.138 Unfortunately, these assurances do not apply to
disabilities under the ADA.139 Some commentators have warned
that personality tests used during the hiring process could be seen as
a covert method for violating the ADA.140 One scholar noted that
“[d]etermining [a] company’s preferred personality traits based on
those possessed by its top performers—given the research correlating personality traits with certain mental impairments—may perpetuate the exclusion of applicants with mental disabilities.”141 For example, in a class action lawsuit, a college student with a near-perfect
SAT score and who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, was
repeatedly rejected from minimum wage jobs at supermarkets and
retail stores.142 These stores all used a personality test that had been
modeled on the “Five Factor Model” test used to diagnose mental

134

Id.
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
136
Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4.
137
See Timmons, supra note 111, at 444.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671, 1702 (2020) [hereinafter Paradox of Automation].
141
Timmons, supra note 111, at 443.
142
Paradox of Automation, supra note 140, at 1702.
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illness.143 The student’s experience shows how AI-powered screening tools can, intentionally or not, exclude even well-qualified candidates along discriminatory lines.
The use of AI during the hiring process at the talent acquisition
stage also implicates age discrimination concerns.144 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) is the federal law that
prohibits employers and employment agencies from age discrimination in job advertising, recruiting, hiring, and other employment opportunities.145 The ADEA also expressly prohibits employment advertisements that discriminate or indicate a preference or limitation
based on age.146 However, age discrimination claims are increasingly common in recent years.147 For instance, an employer was
found to have violated the ADEA by advertising on Facebook for a
position within its company and “limiting the audience for their advertisement to younger applicants.”148 Similarly, the Attorney General of Illinois launched an investigation revealing that several
online automated hiring platforms had design features that discouraged older applicants, violating the ADEA.149
Unintentional discrimination could also seep into AI systems in
less direct ways. An algorithm trained to prefer employees within a
certain commuting distance might result in applicants from poorer
areas being disadvantaged.150 In 2019, Facebook reached a settle-

143

Id.
See Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24, at 3. See generally 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–634 (prohibiting age-based discrimination against applicants or employees age forty or over and between two individuals within the protected age group
in hiring, discharge, promotion, and other terms or conditions of employment).
145
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
146
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(e).
147
See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2019) [hereinafter Age Discrimination] (arguing the prevalence of age discrimination with AI and noting that there is a widespread suspicion
that online job ads may be excluding older workers).
148
Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24, at 4.
149
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Protecting Workers’ Civil Rights in the Digital Age, 21
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2020) [hereinafter Workers’ Civil Rights].
150
See Yang, supra note 16, at 218.
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ment in a case where five civil rights groups alleged that its algorithms discriminated against women and older job seekers.151 As
part of the settlement, Facebook agreed to no longer allow advertisers to target job seekers based on gender, age, or zip code, and that
it would no longer give advertisers detailed targeting options based
on protected classes.152
2. EVALUATING CANDIDATE RISKS
In evaluating candidates, an AI tool can create bias when the
data it uses reflects gender or race disparities. For example, an Amazon hiring initiative allegedly used a tool that rated the resumes of
applicants for tech jobs on a scale skewed to favor men.153 This was
because the criteria for the ratings were based on the resumes submitted by applicants in the previous ten years, and most of those
applicants were male.154 The tool gave lower ratings to resumes containing the word “women’s” or that listed degrees from women’s
colleges. After discovering this flaw, Amazon discarded the algorithm and stated that it “was never used by Amazon recruiters to
evaluate candidates.”155
The use of gamified assessments when screening applications
also raises unique antidiscrimination issues. Some companies use
video games to measure an applicant’s attention span and ability to
remember numbers.156 Such tools may violate federal antidiscrimi-

151

See Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Agrees to Overhaul Targeted Advertising System for Job, Housing and Loan Ads After Discrimination
Complaints, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebook-agrees-to-dismantle-targeted-advertising-system-for-job-housing-and-loan-ads-after-discrimination-complaints/2019/03/19/7dc9b5fa-4983-11e9-b79a-961983b7e0cd_story.html.
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Id.
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JOSEPH O’KEEFE ET AL., BLOOMBERG L., AI REGULATION AND RISKS TO
EMPLOYERS 2 (2019), https://prfirmpwwwcdn0001.azureedge.net/prfirmstgacctpwwwcdncont0001/uploads/3562d2b44291641560ccfaec272fdc50.pdf.
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Id.
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Id.
156
See J. Edward Moreno, Disability Bias Should Be Addressed in AI Rules,
Advocates Say, BLOOMBERG L. (May 6, 2022, 5:45 AM) https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/daily-labor-report/X9OTPGVO000000?bna_news_filter=daily-labor-report.
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nation laws. For instance, using a gamified assessment to screen applications may disadvantage older applicants because, as a group,
older applicants do not perform as well on the games as younger
applicants do, thereby raising ADEA concerns.157 Similarly, a gamified assessment that requires an applicant to identify the emotions
of someone in an image could be more difficult for a person on the
autism spectrum, thus triggering ADA concerns.158
D. Interviewing Stage Risks
Other problems arise when employers rely on AI tools such as
facial and voice recognition and analysis to evaluate candidates.
Certain tools allow employers to assess video interviews of applicants by comparing answers to those given by high-performing employees.159 These tools analyze factors such as facial expression, eye
contact, speech patterns, and word choice in its machine learning
processes.160 But assessments of some facial recognition methods
reveal that they often analyze emotions differently in ways that are,
for example, based on race.161 Civil rights groups have argued that
these systems might unfairly score candidates based on differences
correlated to their race or sex.162
157
Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work:
Artificial Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 25 (2020).
158
See Moreno, supra note 156. See also Sheridan Wall & Hilke Schellmann,
Disability Rights Advocates Are Worried About Discrimination in AI Hiring
Tools, MIT TECH. REV., (July 21, 2021) https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/21/1029860/disability-rights-employment-discrimination-ai-hiring/.
159
See Bogen & Rieke, supra note 55, at 36.
160
Id. See also Stephen J. Malone, The Opportunities and Legal Dangers of
Using Artificial Intelligence to Recruit and Hire Employees, 5 PLI CURRENT: J.
PLI PRESS (2021).
161
See Dave Zielinski, Addressing Artificial Intelligence-Based Hiring Concerns, SHRM (May 22, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/summer2020/pages/artificial-intelligence-based-hiring-concerns.aspx; see
also Ifeoma Ajunwa, An Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems, 34
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 621, 637 (2021) [hereinafter Auditing Imperative] (noting
that facial analysis systems can struggle to read the faces of women with darker
skin).
162
See Zielinski, supra note 161.
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Differences in speech patterns and vocabulary that correlate with
race or ethnicity can complicate automated voice analysis.163 Automated video interviews involve the video capture of word choices,
speech patterns, and facial expressions of job applicants, which AI
tools evaluate to predict an applicant’s fit for jobs and compatibility
with the culture of the organization.164 However, speech recognition
software may be vulnerable to significant differences in performance between certain groups of people if the algorithms have not
been tailored to adjust for differences relating to those specific
groups.165 For example, technology that operates by voice commands could present challenges for individuals who do not speak
English as their first language or for those that speak with a speech
impediment or have a hearing impairment, thus triggering national
origin and disability discrimination concerns.166 Automated video
interviews may also be deemed a form of assessment; thus, they
might implicate the ADA if they are found to screen out applicants
on the basis of their disability.167 For instance, people who are blind
could score lower and be screened out if they fail to make eye contact with the camera.
The use of AI involving cameras, video and audio recording devices, and other sensors, raises the risk that the employer or the AI
tools will collect information in a way that could violate the ADA’s
specific limitations on the use of medical examinations.168 The ADA
prohibits any medical examination or inquiry to determine an applicant’s medical condition or disability unless it is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.169 The EEOC has interpreted this
prohibition to encompass inquiries that, while not ostensibly medical examinations, are nevertheless reasonably likely to elicit information about a disability.170 As a result, certain video interview algorithms, especially those that measure certain personality traits,
163

Friedman & McCarthy, supra note 24, at 2.
See Auditing Imperative, supra note 161, at 637.
165
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Automated Video Interviewing, supra note 104, at 103.
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Id. at 129.
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Id.
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42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)(B), (d)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a).
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may run afoul of the ADA.171 For example, an employer’s review of
data indicating fidgeting, muscle spasms, or involuntary movements
could be considered a disability-related inquiry because these could
indicate certain neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s disease or Lou Gehrig’s disease.172 Importantly, there is no consent exception to the ADA’s general prohibition on disability-related inquiries, and the ADA also prohibits employers from making employment decisions based on disabilities unrelated to the essential
functions of an individual’s job.173 As a consequence, even reviewing seemingly innocuous information that might not be considered
a disability-related inquiry for purposes of the ADA, such as data
indicating low muscle strength, could increase risk to the employer.174 If the employer discharged the employee after reviewing
the report, even if the information failed to play a role, the employee
may have grounds to credibly allege that the employer terminated
the employee because of a disability or perceived disability, even if
the employer, in fact, terminated the employee for a lawful legitimate reason.175
E. Background Check Risks
The use of facial recognition technology in background checks
raises the risk of disparate impact discrimination.176 Specifically, the
technology has been criticized for providing a disproportionately
higher percentage of false indications of a criminal background for
U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N
(July
27,
2000),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-enforcement-guidance-disability-related-inquiries-and-medical. Regardless of job-relatedness, the
ADA forbids an employer from requiring any medical examinations before a conditional employment offer is made. Id.
171
Automated Video Interviewing, supra note 104, at 132–33.
172
See Mathiason et al., supra note 25.
173
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
174
See Jim Paretti et al., EEOC Issues Guidance on Artificial Intelligence and
Americans with Disabilities Act Considerations, LITTLER (May 18, 2022),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/eeoc-issues-guidance-artificial-intelligence-and-americans.
175
See id.
176
See Kerri A. Thompson, Countenancing Employment Discrimination: Facial Recognition in Background Checks, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 63, 78 (2020).

32

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

African Americans compared to other racial and ethnic groups.177
As one commentator explained, “[i]f the algorithm tends to provide
false positives, and if there are more photos of African Americans
in the databases, the target’s likelihood of being falsely matched to
someone with a ‘criminal’ background will skyrocket.”178 Consequently, this commentator has urged the EEOC to issue guidance
alerting employers that using facial recognition technology in background checks may subject employers to lawsuits under Title VII.179
Some employers also conduct social media background checks
to determine whether applicants’ social media presence cautions
against extending a job offer.180 According to some scholars,
“emerging AI applications that can engage in wide, perpetual
sweeps of social media will change the frequency and penetration of
employer social media eavesdropping.”181 Unless they are performed carefully, social media background checks are fraught with
issues for several reasons. Notably, such checks could collect information regarding an applicant’s race, sex, sexual identity, disability,
pregnancy, or health, which employers cannot lawfully consider
during the hiring process.182
F. Job Offer Risks
Finally, as the last step of the hiring process, employers may extend offers to applicants via AI-powered technologies.183 There are
software programs that predict the probability that certain types of
candidates will accept given job offers and programs that help employers increase their chances of attracting desirable candidates.184
These software programs allow the employer to adjust salary, bonus,
stock options, and other benefits to see in real time the prediction of
the resulting changes.185 Despite the benefits associated with such
177

Id.
Id. at 67.
179
Id. at 84.
180
Bales & Stone, supra note 157, at 20–21.
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Id. at 21.
182
Paradox of Automation, supra note 140, at 1703–04.
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Id. at 1704 (discussing the use of AI hiring systems used during the offer
process).
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programs, the use of these might magnify pay gaps for women and
racial minorities because the data often includes proxies for a
worker’s socioeconomic and racial status that might be reflected in
salary requirement predictions.186 Moreover, they might also undermine ever-growing state and local laws that bar employers from considering candidates’ salary histories.187
G. Employee Performance, Promotion, and Pay Risks
Using algorithms to assist with performance management, promotions, and compensation also raises serious legal concerns. After
an employer uses AI to hire an employee, it may use AI to track
performance, determine pay, and make decisions about promotions
and terminations.188 There are several notable antidiscrimination
risks with employee performance tracking. For example, UPS uses
AI to monitor and report on driver safety and productivity and to
track drivers’ movements.189 But such productivity tracking may run
afoul of federal antidiscrimination laws if the failure to achieve
productivity standards is attributable to a disability.190 Others fear
that unscrupulous employers will abuse the technology to monitor
by targeting populations of a certain sex, race, or age disproportionally.191 A former EEOC Chair contends that aggressive productivity
targets also might operate disproportionately to exclude individuals
based on protected characteristics such as age, disability, and religion.192 Further, employee monitoring may conflict with the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) if companies made
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See Alia Abdi & Courtney Blanchard, Does Your State Prohibit Asking
Salary History?, JD SUPRA (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/does-your-state-prohibit-asking-salary-9668197/ (discussing the growing
number of state and local laws prohibiting employers from requesting salary history from applicants).
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AI-driven employment decisions based on employees’ visits to certain websites such as a disease support group.193
The very use of AI in the workplace may expose employers to
liability under the ADEA if older workers are unfamiliar with the
AI technologies.194 If workers over forty years old are generally less
proficient at working with AI tools than younger employees, employment decisions based on this criterion will likely impact them
either directly or disproportionately on the basis of their age.195 If
those 40 or older are adversely impacted by an employer’s use of AI
tools or systems, then the employer may face disparate impact
claims under the ADEA.196 Moreover, latent biases and perceptions
that younger workers are more technologically advanced or adaptive
could spawn disparate treatment claims.197 As with age discrimination, hidden biases and stereotypes that women and minorities are
less technologically or mathematically adept may expose employers
to disparate treatment claims under Title VII.
H. Reasonable Accommodation Risks
There are also thorny legal issues involving reasonable accommodations under Title VII and the ADA when it comes to AI in the
workplace. The ADA in particular poses unique challenges for AI.
Unlike other antidiscrimination laws that merely prohibit certain
conduct, the ADA imposes affirmative obligations on employers.198
The ADA includes a reasonable accommodation provision which
requires covered employers to make reasonable accommodations to
193

See Jason Downs & Sarah Auchterlonie, Proxy Problems—Solving for Discrimination
in
Algorithms,
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Mathiason et al., supra note 25, at 8; see also Age Discrimination, supra
note 147, at 11–15.
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Id.; see also Ron Brown, Robots, New Technology, and Industry 4.0 in
Changing Workplaces. Impacts on Labor and Employment Laws, 7 AM. U. BUS.
L. REV. 349, 372 (2018) (noting that, in such cases, “the integrity and lawfulness
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the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.199
The affirmative obligation is what makes the ADA unique
among federal antidiscrimination statutes.200 Once an employee requests an accommodation, the employer must engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation that allows the
employee to perform the essential functions of his or her job effectively.201 Generally, these accommodations are granted through an
interactive process between the employer and employee; for present
purposes, between two humans.202 This is also true under Title VII,
which specifies that if an employee has a religious belief or practice
that conflicts with a job requirement, the employer must accommodate the employee unless doing so would be an undue burden for the

Generally, undue hardship to the employer means “the accommodation
would be too difficult or too expensive to provide, in light of the employer’s size,
financial resources, and the needs of the business.” Disability Discrimination and
Employment Decisions, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/disability-discrimination-and-employment-decisions (last
visited Sep. 12, 2022).
200
Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Mar. 25, 2011),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/questions-and-answers-final-rule-implementing-ada-amendments-act-2008#:~:text=The%20final%20regulations%20provide%20a,concentrating%2C%20thinking%2C%20communicating%2C%20interacting. To be eligible for a reasonable accommodation, an individual must satisfy either the “actual” or “record of” definitions of a disability.
An individual is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation if the individual satisfies the “regarded as” definition of a disability.
201
O’Donnell v. Univ. Hosps. Cleveland Med. Ctr., 833 F. App’x 605, 617
(6th Cir. 2020). During the interactive process, the employer and employee are
required to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome these limitations. The
ADA requires the parties to act in good faith. Although mandatory, failure to engage in the interactive process is only an independent violation of the ADA if the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that he or she proposed a reasonable
accommodation. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1041 (6th Cir. 2014).
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See Sonderling, supra note 3.
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employer.203 When deciding whether to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious beliefs or practices, employers
are generally allowed to make a limited inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of the employee’s claim that the belief or practice at
issue is religious and sincerely held, and that the belief or practice
gives rise to the need for the accommodation.204 Whether AI technologies can handle such an inquiry into oft-complicated theological
matters remains uncertain, but the risk of liability remains.
Other workplace technologies raise reasonable accommodation
concerns as well. While the overwhelming effect of wearable enhancing devices generally improves employees’ physical capabilities, wearable technology also carries the potential to make apparent
disabilities that previously did not affect employees’ abilities to
work and were, therefore, unknown to coworkers.205 Therefore,
when incorporating wearable technologies, employers must be
aware of the possibility that certain workers may be limited in their
abilities to use the new technology. For example, workers may be
sensitive to the materials in the wearable devices or may have preexisting disabilities that interfere with the fit and movement of the
technology or that the technology would exacerbate.206 These limitations themselves may qualify as disabilities under the ADA, potentially requiring a separate reasonable accommodation.207
203

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
Section 12: Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-12-religious discrimination#h_79076346735821610749860135. The guidance also
notes that employees should cooperate with an employer’s requests for reasonable
information. Id. For instance, “if an employee requested a schedule change to accommodate daily prayers, the employer might need to ask for information about
the religious observance, such as the time and duration of the daily prayers, in
order to determine if accommodation can be granted without posing an undue
hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.” Id. If a reasonable alternative accommodation is provided by the employer, “the employee must cooperate
by attempting to meet his religious needs through the employer’s proposed accommodation if possible. Whether an employer has a reasonable basis for seeking
to verify the employee’s stated beliefs will depend on the facts of a particular
case.” Id.
205
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206
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These illustrations present only a high-level survey of the key
issues implicated by the most common uses of AI in the workplace.
Ultimately, the legal issues associated with the use of AI in employment decisions will continue to evolve as the technologies become
more sophisticated and widespread. This legal landscape will continue to evolve as the legal challenges are brought in federal and
state courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES TO AI
As with all potentially discriminatory employment decisions
that affect individuals’ livelihood, the use of AI in the workplace has
elicited a variety of government responses. Governments at all levels, from local legislators to international regulators, are experiencing the challenge of broadly governing AI technologies.208 Legislation is particularly challenging because AI develops rapidly and can
be instantly scaled across industries.209 Overall, efforts to develop a
harmonized regulatory framework for AI are still in the early stages
on the federal, state, and international levels. This Part first explores
the responses to AI at the federal level, including executive orders
and guidance issued by federal agencies. Next, this Part reviews legislative and regulatory responses to AI at the state and local levels.
It is important to note that many states and localities have analogous
antidiscrimination laws that may provide greater protections to employees and applicants than federal law. Still, this Article will focus
on specific AI-related legislative responses. Then, the Part shifts to
examine AI responses on the international level before finally discussing industry self-regulation.
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See Jackson, supra note 29, at 49.
Id. (explaining that much of the uncertainty among legislative bodies stems
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how machine learning systems complicates the question of how to regulate AI).
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A. Federal Action
Generally, the United States has taken a less-centralized approach to AI regulation that aims to account for the possible obstacles to innovation.210 In 2019, President Trump issued an executive
order calling for the creation of a coordinated federal strategy,
known as the American AI Initiative, to be developed through the
National Science and Technology Council.211 Although the executive order was aspirational to a significant degree, it signaled that
the United States government was interested in prioritizing AI development.212 Among the American AI Initiative’s guiding principles are the need to train current and future generations of American
workers in the skills needed to develop and apply AI technologies
lawfully and effectively; the need to foster public trust and confidence in AI technologies; and the obligation to develop and apply
AI in a manner consistent with civil liberties, privacy, and widelyheld American values.213
In November 2020, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum which guides federal agencies regarding the
development of regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to using
AI in the private sector.214 This guidance attempts to ensure public
engagement in the regulatory process to foster a legally compliant
210

See id. at 42–43.
See generally Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 14, 2019).
The Executive Order tasked federal agencies with prioritizing AI in terms of research, development, and issuing grants and identified federal datasets suitable
for public access that will facilitate AI research and development by the private
sector. Aram A. Gavoor, The Impending Judicial Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in the Administrative State, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 197, 198
(2022) (describing Executive Orders regarding AI issued during both the Obama
and Trump administrations).
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of Artificial Intelligence, 98 MICH. BAR J. 34, 34 (2019).
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See Aram A. Gavoor & Raffi Teperdjian, A Structural Solution to Mitigating Artificial Intelligence Bias in Administrative Agencies, 89 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUENDO 71, 90 (2021).
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Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, on
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deployment of AI based on trust, fairness, equality, transparency,
safety, reliability, and scientific integrity.215 The guidance emphasizes that “[f]ederal agencies must avoid regulatory or non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth.”216
In December of 2020, the Trump Administration issued a second
executive order that enumerated principles for guiding the use of AI
in government and established a common policy for implementing
these principles.217 The Executive Order stated that AI should be
used to improve government operations in a manner that remains
consistent with all applicable laws, including those related to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.218 Among the other principles
to guide the federal government in its use of AI are accuracy, reliability, security, responsibility, traceability, transparency, and accountability.219 The Executive Order also directed all federal agencies to prepare an inventory of AI use cases.220
In January of 2021, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 into law, which included the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act (“NAIIA”) of 2020.221
The NAIIA established a critical framework for coordinating AI research and policy across the federal government and created a
roadmap to position the United States as a global leader in developing and adopting trustworthy AI in the public and private sectors.222
The NAIIA’s goals include preparing the federal workforce for AI,
conducting and funding AI research, and identifying and mitigating

215
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See generally William M. (Mac) Thornberry Nat’l Def. Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021, 15 U.S.C. §§ 9401–9462.
222
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216

40

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

against AI risks.223 Practitioners have explained that “the NAIIA
does not set forth merely lofty goals, but rather, legislates concrete
matters of critical importance for economic and national security.”224 To accomplish its goals, the NAIIA established several new
governance bodies with interlocking missions to help advance the
law’s objectives.225
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 also directed
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards
and Technology (“NIST”) to develop “a voluntary risk management
framework for trustworthy AI systems.”226 In 2022, NIST released
a draft of its AI Risk Management Framework that addresses risks
in the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI systems.227
NIST simultaneously released guidance for trustworthy and responsible development and use of AI, notably including suggested governance processes to address bias.228
In October 2021, the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(“OSTP”), began a series of listening sessions and related events to
form the groundwork for an AI “Bill of Rights” allegedly “to guard
against the powerful technologies we have created.”229 The original
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premise for the document was the apparent belief by OSTP that
basic civil rights protections do not exist when it comes to AI. Many
advocacy groups in the technology space supported this effort and
lobbied for its release.230 The document’s release was delayed due
to significant turnover within OSTP and other issues until October
2022 when, under new leadership, OSTP released a “Blueprint for
an AI Bill of Rights.”231 Instead of the anticipated “Bill of Rights”
the “Blueprint” simply reiterated basic principles of privacy, transparency, and protections from discrimination.232 As the “Blueprint”
was not the actual “Bill of Rights” advocacy groups were promised,
it has largely been criticized as “toothless” and “insufficient.”233 Regardless, it remains unclear why existing rights are insufficient and
why citizens deserve narrowly-tailored rights for AI rather than
broad-based rights that cover all their activities and interactions. In
addition, some of the goals included in an AI “Blueprint” would
likely necessitate the government to take aggressive steps to regulate
AI to ensure adequate enforcement; and, as a consequence, hamper
innovation and lead to increased regulatory adventurism.
In more recent years, independent federal agencies have begun
to assume the challenge of regulating AI in their respective domains.
For instance, the EEOC has shown increased intermittent interest in
AI-related employment discrimination. In 2016, the EEOC held a
public meeting on the equal employment opportunity implications
(Oct.
22,
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2022,
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of big data in the workplace.234 However, it did not release a report
or issue public guidance to share any lessons or outcomes of the
meeting. In October of 2021, the EEOC launched an initiative to
ensure that AI and other emerging tools used in hiring and other employment decisions comply with federal civil rights laws that the
agency enforces.235 In the announcement, the EEOC noted that AI
“tools may mask and perpetuate bias or create new discriminatory
barriers to jobs.”236
A few months later, the EEOC and U.S. Department of Justice
each released a technical assistance document about disability discrimination when employers use AI and other software tools to
make employment decisions.237 It is worth emphasizing the EEOC’s
guidance is limited to only disability discrimination, was not voted
on by the full Commission, and did not go through the administrative law process involving notice and comment.238 This is particularly troubling since this means that the guidance does not reflect
stakeholder input. Practitioners explained that “[t]he EEOC’s guidance appears to raise more questions than it answers, in an area of
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C.F.R. § 1695.4(d) (“If the guidance document sets forth the Commission’s position on a legal principle for the first time or changes the Commission’s legal position on any issue, the Commission must approve the guidance document by majority vote.”); see also Vin Gurrieri, Republican AGs Get Feds’ Bostock Guidance
Put on Ice, LAW360 (July 17, 2022, 2:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1512315/republican-ags-get-feds-bostock-guidance-puton-ice (discussing EEOC guidance enjoined by a federal court because it was
“unilaterally” issued by the EEOC’s chair without ever being put to a vote by the
full Commission). See also Texas v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, No. 2:21CV-194-Z, 2022 WL 4835346, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2022) (stressing the importance of a Commission vote).
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law that is changing rapidly and already poses compliance challenges for employers.”239
During the Trump Administration, DOL’s Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Program’s (“OFCCP”) issued guidance stating that the use of screening devices like games, challenges, and
video submissions that use AI algorithms to assess qualifications
may trigger obligations under the Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures.240 OFCCP’s guidance explains if an employer’s use of an AI-based selection procedure results in an adverse
impact on a particular racial, sex, or ethnic group, the procedure may
trigger OFCCP scrutiny.241
Other federal agencies have issued AI guidance related to employment. Notably, in 2020, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) issued guidance outlining recommended best practices, and
emphasizing AI tools’ transparency, explainability, and fair use.242
This guidance stresses that AI tools should be transparent, explainable, fair, empirically sound, and that employers should hold themselves accountable for compliance, ethics, fairness, and nondiscrimination.243 The FTC issued further AI guidance in 2021 warning

239
See Paretti et al., supra note 174 (explaining that in many instances, the
ADA’s requirements with respect to accommodation and prohibition on unlawful
screening may render the use of AI tools vastly more complicated and legally
fraught).
240
See Off. of Fed. Cont. Compliance Programs, Validation of Employee Selection Procedures, U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB (2019), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/faqs/employee-selection-procedures#Q6. In short, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures articulates standards for compliance with
certain requirements under Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5–.9.
241
See Nathaniel M. Glasser et al., Are Your AI Selection Tools Validated?
OFCCP Provides Guidance for Validation of AI-Based Algorithms, NAT’L L.
REV. (July 31, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/are-your-ai-selection-tools-validated-ofccp-provides-guidance-validation-ai-based.
242
See Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/04/using-artificial-intelligence-algorithms; see also Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Health
Care, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 45 (2020).
243
Smith, supra note 242.
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companies against biased, discriminatory, deceptive, or unfair practices in AI algorithms.244 FTC’s guidance concluded by stressing:
“Hold yourself accountable – or be ready for the FTC to do it for
you.”245
In November of 2021, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued an advisory opinion affirming that consumer
reporting companies, including employment screening companies,
are violating the law if they engage in careless name-matching procedures.246 In this advisory opinion, the CFPB expressed concern
with the screening practice of assigning a false identity to applicants
for jobs and housing due to error-ridden background screening reports that the agency believed may disproportionately impact minority applicants.247 The advisory opinion reaffirms the obligations and
requirements of consumer reporting companies to use reasonable
procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy.
B. State Laws
In recent years, states have increasingly sought to fill the federal
void by enacting their own AI legislation.248 Several of these statutes
are crafted in ways that portend further regulation. On one hand, the
accelerating pace at which states have created their own regimes

244

See Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of AI, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2021/04/aiming-truth-fairness-equity-your-companys-use-ai (warning companies to ensure that their AI does not
reflect racial or gender bias, and indicated that failure to do so may result in “deception, discrimination - and an FTC law enforcement action”).
245
Id. (illustrating this point by explaining that if an algorithm results in credit
discrimination against a protected class, this could trigger an FTC complaint).
246
CFPB Takes Action to Stop False Identification by Background Screeners,
CFPB (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-stop-false-identification-by-background-screeners/?_sm_au_=iHVFR9tfrf49TNNMFcVTvKQkcK8MG (“[T]he CFPB affirmed
that the practice of matching consumer records solely through the matching of
names is illegal under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.”).
247
Id.
248
See Shackelford & Dockery, supra note 28, at 302–03 (explaining that
states are increasingly wading into the AI arena because “the market is unlikely
to fill a consumer or societal need”).
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presents an opportunity to evaluate the benefits and pitfalls of various approaches to regulating AI.249 On the other hand, the patchwork of laws across the nation presents compliance challenges, particularly for employers operating in multiple states.
The Illinois Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act is one of
the first state laws designed to regulate AI.250 The law requires employers to provide advance notice to applicants that the employer
will use video interview technology, and to explain to the applicant
how the AI works and what general characteristics the technology
will use to evaluate applicants.251 The notice must inform applicants
that “artificial intelligence analysis” may be used to evaluate their
application.252 Moreover, candidates are given some control over
what happens to the video after their assessment.253 Employers are
required to destroy the video, including all backup copies, within 30
days of an applicant’s request.254
The Illinois law has some major flaws that may generate more
issues for employers than it resolves. Most critically, the law lacks
the most basic, elemental component: it fails to define AI, AI analysis, and several other operative terms that the statute purports to
regulate.255 This injects facial ambiguity that undercuts the efficacy
of the statute and other benefits, just like any law that aims to regulate a subject it does not define. For example, this ambiguity means
that common applications of AI may not even be covered.256 Mean-
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See id. at 303.
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
42/1-20 (LEXIS through 2022 Legis. Sess.); see Automated Video Interviewing,
supra note 104, at 138.
251
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act §§ 1–20 (LEXIS).
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Id.
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See id.
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Id.
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See Kwabena A. Appenteng et al., Implementing Illinois’ AI Video Interview Act: Five Steps Employers Can Take to Address Hidden Questions and Integrate Policies with Existing Employment Laws, LITTLER (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/implementing-illinois-aivideo-interview-act-five-steps-employers-can.
256
See Automated Video Interviewing, supra note 104, at 138 (citing
“track[ing] data about its candidates” as an example of an employer use of AI that
would not be covered under the law).
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while, the notice requirement merely gives a highly generalized description of the mandatory content for the notice.257 Perhaps even
more important, the AI Interview Act is silent about penalties, enforcement, and a private right of action, which could raise potential
hurdles to effective enforcement.258 In addition, the law claims to
protect applicants “based in Illinois,” but it does not specifically
state whether it purports to regulate out-of-state employers, particularly when they are hiring for a position located outside of Illinois.259
Finally, the law is silent about whether employers may refuse to
consider applicants who decline consent.260
In 2020, Maryland enacted a law prohibiting employers from using facial recognition technology during pre-employment job interviews unless the applicant consents by signing a specified waiver.261
Under the law, to use facial recognition services in interviewing applicants, an employer must obtain an applicant’s written consent and
a waiver that states the applicant’s name, the date of the interview,
that the applicant consents to the use of facial recognition during the
interview, and that the applicant has read the waiver.262 Practitioners
have noted many of the same difficulties plaguing the Illinois law.
For while the law defines terms such as “facial template” and “facial
recognition services,” the terms provide little guidance and leave
broad gaps for interpretation that complicate compliance and potentially undermine enforcement.263
257

See Appenteng et al., supra note 255.
See Auditing Imperative, supra note 161, at 644–45 (highlighting how silence on enforcement may raise questions as to whether applicants can recover
statutory damages for violations).
259
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act §§ 1–20 (LEXIS); see Matthew
Jedreski et al., Illinois Becomes First State to Regulate Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence to Evaluate Video Interviews, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-law-advisor/2019/09/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-employers.
260
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act §§ 1–20 (LEXIS); see Jedreski
et al., supra note 259.
261
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-717 (LEXIS through 2022 legislation).
262
Id.
263
See Adam Forman & Nathaniel Glasser, New Maryland Law Requires Applicant Consent Prior to Using Facial Recognition Technology in Job Interviews,
JD SUPRA (July 10, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-marylandlaw-requires-applicant-50746/.
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Several recent state privacy and biometric laws in states including California, Illinois, Virginia, and Colorado also implicate AI
governance issues. Many of these comprehensive state privacy laws
include additional disclosure, notice, destruction of data, and similar
requirements.264
C. Local Laws
There has also been increased interest in regulating AI at the local level. Most notably, in 2021, New York City passed what purports to be the broadest AI employment law in the United States that
will severely regulate employers’ use of AI tools for hiring and promotion decisions in New York City.265 Effective in 2023, the law
applies to employers that use “automated employment decision
tools” which is broadly defined as “any computational process, derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or
artificial intelligence,” which scores, classifies, or otherwise makes
a recommendation that is used to substantially assist or replace the
decision-making process from that of an individual.266 The law prohibits the use of such tools to screen either an applicant or employee
for any employment decision, unless the tool or tools have been subject to a “bias audit” and certified as “unbiased” according to an unspecified standard.267 A “bias audit” is defined as an impartial evaluation by an independent auditor that tests, at minimum, the tool’s
disparate impact upon individuals based on their race, ethnicity, and
sex.268 The City’s law also includes three disclosure obligations, including a requirement for employers to notify employees or candidates who reside in the city that the tool will be used and of the
264
Automated Video Interviewing, supra note 104, at 140–41; see also Chong
et al., supra note 227.
265
2021 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 144, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-870, 20-872,
20-873. The law’s bias audit requirement includes race, ethnicity, and sex, but
does not include disability and age discrimination.
266
N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-870, 20-872, 20-873.
267
Id.; see Allan G. King & Michael J. Lotito, In New York City, Subjectivity
Trumps Data Analytics, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 11, 2022, 10:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2022/03/11/in-new-york-city-subjectivity-trumps-data-analytics/.
268
N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-870, 20-872, 20-873. See Scherer & Shetty,
supra note 118.
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“characteristics” the tool will analyze to assess.269 Specifically, the
law requires employers to notify candidates ten business days prior
to using the AI tool with respect to them.270 Practically, this may not
be realistic for many employers because they recruit and hire so
quickly.271 Employers may find this requirement burdensome for
extending their hiring process, especially when they are competing
for the best available applicants.272 Also, the law is unclear whether
non-residents of the city are required to receive notice even when
applying to a city-based position and the level of detail required in
disclosing the “summary” of the audit.273
Despite the law’s pro-employee intentions, a large number of
civil rights groups, including the National Employment Law Project,
the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, condemned the law as vague and ineffective,
contending that it will actually “rubber-stamp” the very discrimination it seeks to prevent.274 Other groups likewise contend that the
ordinance’s key provisions were “introduced and rammed through
in a rushed process that excluded workers, civil rights groups, and
other stakeholders from providing any input.”275 On a practical
level, practitioners criticize the law because it leaves too many unanswered questions regarding the nature of the required audit, the
AI tools, or processes that fall under (or outside of) the law’s mandate, as well as basic coverage.276 Practitioners contend that “[t]he
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N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 20-870, 20-872, 20-873.
Id.
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See Eli Z. Freedberg et al., New York City Enacts Law that Hinders Use of
Automated Tools in Hiring and Promotion Decisions, LITTLER (Dec. 28, 2021),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/new-york-city-enacts-lawhinders-use-automated-tools-hiring-and.
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Id.
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See Erin Mulvaney, Artificial Intelligence Hiring Bias Spurs Scrutiny and
New Regs, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 29, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/artificial-intelligence-hiring-bias-spurs-scrutinyand-new-regs (noting that these groups have argued that the “weak projections
will backfire, enabling more biased AI software”).
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Scherer & Shetty, supra note 118.
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See Matthew Jedreski et al., New York City’s Groundbreaking New Law
Will Require Audits of AI and Algorithmic Systems That Drive Employment Deci270
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law’s poor construction creates an HR nightmare for employers
seeking to staff up.”277 Ultimately, the New York City law could
have been a model for jurisdictions around the country to follow,
but instead it typifies a missed opportunity and leaves important
forms of discrimination unaddressed.
D. International Laws
In contrast to the United States, many nations have taken a more
heavy-handed approach regulating AI. As such, it is important
briefly to review certain international AI efforts related to employment matters. One prominent example is the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). In addition to broad privacy protections, the GDPR also protects from algorithmic profiling
and contains a right to obtain an explanation of any automated decisions that significantly affect users.278 For instance, one provision
effectively prevents companies from engaging in automated decision-making without human intervention that affects an individual’s
legal rights or that significantly affects an individual, such as entirely automated recruiting.279
Even beyond the GDPR, Europe has moved toward comprehensive legislation limiting AI’s uses across various industries.280 In
2021, the European Commission published a landmark AI proposed
sions, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-law-advisor/2021/12/nyc-employment-ai-bias-audit-law
(noting that the new law does not define who or what constitutes an adequate
independent auditor).
277
King & Lotito, supra note 267.
278
O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 153, at 4–5.
279
Specifically, Article 22 states that an individual “shall have the right not to
be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 153, at 4–5. Commentators explain
that pursuant to Article 22, companies can only engage in fully automated decision-making affecting legal or significant rights if required for entering or performing a contract between an organization and an individual, if authorized by
law, or if the individual provides explicit consent. Id. See also Brandon W. Jackson, Cybersecurity, Privacy, and Artificial Intelligence: An Examination of Legal
Issues Surrounding the European Union General Data Protection Regulation and
Autonomous Network Defense, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 169, 194–95 (2020).
280
See O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 153, at 5.
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regulation creating the first ever global legal framework focused
solely on AI.281 The European Commission’s AI regulation will significantly impact many entities who use, sell, or develop AI systems
and introduce a new set of legal obligations as well as a monitoring
and enforcement regime that includes substantial non-compliance
penalties.282
Individual countries have developed polices on AI or have taken
steps towards the regulation of AI. On the European front, France,
Germany, Austria, and other nations have made significant efforts
to encourage the responsible use of AI to prioritize human rights and
consumer control.283 In the United Kingdom, regulators have created a data-protection focused model that may provide clarity in employment matters involving AI.284 Singapore’s Model Governance
Framework is illustrative in that it has focused on providing an accountability-based model framework to use AI responsibly.285 In establishing this framework, the government of Singapore worked
closely with industry associations to jointly develop industry standards.286 Singapore’s approach to AI governance has benefitted by
adapting or amending already existing laws instead of creating new
legislation.287
E. Industry Self-Regulation
Even without national or international regulation, AI’s increasing ubiquity and expanding commercial potential has led some com281

See Sussman et al., supra note 38.
Id.
283
See Angelica Salvi del Pero et al., Using Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace: What are the Main Ethical Risks? (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, Paper No. 273, 2022), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/840a2d9f-en.pdf?expires=1658773094&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=D5F73A1DB801C415B4538835FF343E3F (discussing wide range of responses in individual countries).
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See Salvi del Pero et al., supra note 283, at 46 (discussing the United Kingdom National AI Strategy).
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See Shackelford & Dockery, supra note 28, at 311.
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See Singapore’s Approach to AI Governance, PERS. DATA PROT. COMM’N,
https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/help-and-resources/2020/01/model-ai-governanceframework.
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panies to turn to self-regulation. In recent years, it has become common for technology companies, directly or through trade associations, to develop and publish their own AI principles and guidelines,
including companies such as Google, Microsoft, Intel, and IBM.288
Many companies have also formed partnerships to foster responsible AI development and deployment. One of the most prominent
examples is the Partnership on AI, which brings together companies
such as Amazon and Microsoft with “research institutions, civic societies, and other non-profits under basic tenets to ‘study and formulate best practices on AI technologies.’”289 The Partnership on AI
has developed a series of tenets for the development of AI that commits its members to ongoing engagement with stakeholders to protect the privacy, security, and other rights of individuals.290 Several
leading academic institutions and premier civil rights groups have
also developed their own best practices and ethical guidelines.291 In
addition, the World Economic Forum, an international non-governmental organization, published a toolkit that was developed in collaboration with over fifty global HR, legal, and ethics experts to promote the responsible use of AI-based tools for HR purposes.292 This
and other self-regulatory efforts, especially if they are thorough and
288

Id. at 305–06 (discussing the role that universities around the world have
played in developing and publishing ethical guidelines around AI development
and deployment).
289
See id.
290
See Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 433 (2017). Similarly, the Business Roundtable has released a “Roadmap for Responsible AI” that
lists 10 core principles that businesses should consider to help ensure the responsible use of AI. See Business Roundtable Roadmap for Responsible Artificial Intelligence, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Jan. 26, 2022), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/Business_Roundtable_Artificial_Intelligence_Roadmap_Jan2022_1.pdf.
291
See Shackelford & Dockery, supra note 28, at 311 (listing academic universities and civil rights organizations); CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH.,
ALGORITHM-DRIVEN HIRING TOOLS: INNOVATIVE RECRUITMENT OR EXPEDITED
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION? 15 (2020), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Full-Text-Algorithm-driven-Hiring-Tools-Innovative-Recruitment-or-Expedited-Disability-Discrimination.pdf.
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See Human-Centred Artificial Intelligence for Human Resources, WORLD
ECON. F., https://www.weforum.org/projects/human-centred-artificial-intelligence-for-human-resources (last visited Oct. 23, 2022).
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successful, will potentially deter more heavy-handed governmental
obligations.293
Individual companies are also spearheading efforts to combat AI
bias in other ways. For instance, IBM has developed an AI Fairness
360 toolkit.294 This software toolkit checks for and mitigates unwanted bias in datasets, machine learning models, and state-of-theart algorithms.295 The toolkit is also an open-source project, allowing outside contributors to share their metrics and algorithms.296
Other prominent self-regulatory associations have emerged in
recent years. In late 2021, employers across various industries, including CVS Health, Deloitte, General Motors, Humana, Mastercard, Nike, and Walmart formed the Data & Trust Alliance.297 The
group seeks to adopt criteria to mitigate data and algorithmic bias in
HR and workforce decisions, including recruiting, compensation,
and employee development.298 To date, the group has developed a
comprehensive evaluation and scoring system for AI software.299
Many commentators have argued that self-regulation within the
private sector is imperative for addressing AI employment-related
problems since the industry has the expertise that is incomparable to
any other entity involved in the regulatory process.300
293

See Guihot et al., supra note 290, at 433.
Kush R. Varshney, Introducing AI Fairness 360, IBM: RESEARCH BLOGS
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2018/09/ai-fairness-360/.
See also Egger, supra note 32, at 556–57.
295
See Varshney, supra note 294.
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See id.
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See Lohr, supra note 34.
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See id.
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See id. (More specifically, the Data & Trust Alliance has created a fiftyfive question evaluation, which covers thirteen topics, and a scoring system to
evaluate AI use.).
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See, e.g., Egger, supra note 32, at 556; Magnuson, supra note 10, at 373
(contending that “it is likely that self-regulation will be significantly more effective at cabining artificial intelligence’s risks than regulatory enforcement actions
could ever be. Regulators are, by their very nature, outsiders. They do not know
the inner workings of financial institutions nearly as well as insiders do, and they
do not have the levels of expertise in machine learning that are available to the
private sector.”); see also Guihot et al., supra note 290, at 455 (explaining that
public regulators lack the requisite knowledge to understand the problem that
needs regulating).
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Industry self-regulatory approaches are a highly effective mechanism to manage risk because of the rapidly changing nature of the
underlying technology.301 Not surprisingly, in the absence of a federal standard, a growing number of companies have adopted policies
and procedures designed to prevent AI tools from delivering biased
results that could perpetuate or even worsen employment discrimination.302
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The rapid growth of AI has led to a growing number of both
legislative and non-regulatory proposals. At the outset, scholars and
other commentators have stressed the need to be cautious when considering laws and regulations related to AI due to the uncertainty
surrounding the technology.303 Indeed, because AI lacks a consistent
and established definition or manifestation, legislators and regulators have faced challenges developing a clear AI policy infrastructure.304
A growing number of legislative proposals have focused on alternatives to the direct regulation of AI systems by creating centralized agencies or commissions for AI technologies.305 Any such body
would likely be responsible for identifying principles to govern the
development and application of AI, as well as enforcing any promulgated standards. On the other hand, different proposals have focused more on assigning and quantifying liability for actions taken
or influenced by AI systems.306 On the international front, some organizations and nations have proposed regulations that aim to cover
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providers and vendors of AI systems, meaning the entities that develop the system and place it on the market or that develop the system and use it for themselves.307
Meanwhile, a growing number of experts, scholars, and industry
executives have focused on innovative and forward-thinking nonlegislative proposals. Specifically, some have highlighted the model
risk management framework implemented in the financial sector.308
Since the financial sector has applied this framework for over a decade, companies using AI can pay attention to lessons learned over
the years to best manage risks associated with AI and other emerging technologies.309 The crux of such a framework is that companies
must audit their AI tools to verify objectively that they are operating
as advertised and free from unlawful bias.310
This Part explores a few legislative and other proposals advanced by practitioners and scholars in recent years. Because global
proposals are illuminating as potential guideposts for United States
AI policy, this Part will also examine international proposals, such
as the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act.
A. U.S. Legislative Proposals
In recent years, Congress has expressed interest in regulating AI.
In 2022, Democratic members of Congress reintroduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act, which would grant the FTC authority to
promulgate regulations mandating that large companies assess their
AI tools for potential unlawful bias.311 Specifically, the bill would
require all large companies to perform a so-called bias impact assessment of any automated system that makes critical decisions in a
variety of sectors, including employment, financial services,
healthcare, housing, and legal services.312 The bill has been strongly

307

See id. at 50.
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Cong. § 1 (2022).
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criticized for its perceived overreach, lack of definitional clarity, insufficient direction to the agency, and several other shortcomings
and is unlikely ever to become law.313
Other legislative proposals advocate for the creation of new
agencies and certifying entities. One proposal would create a new
agency with the authority to block certain misuses of technology,
funded by a four percent AI tax.314 Critics of the overall proposal
largely focus on this tax because there would be a lack of support in
the business community.315 Another legislative proposal would create a certifying agency with broad powers to ban products it believes
to be unsafe, and creates a liability system that distinguishes between certified and uncertified AI programs.316 The proposal’s architect contends that a properly structured approval process might
help ensure that data mining models are not statistically biased and
that the social costs of using such models do not exceed the benefits.317 A somewhat related proposal has been advanced in which
external third-party audits specific to automated hiring systems
would be completed either through a governmental agency or a nonmachine learning, statistics, or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques and excluding passive computing infrastructure) that uses computation, the
result of which serves as a basis for a decision or judgment.” Id.
313
See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 242, at 36. The other shortcomings
the authors list are that the bill: (1) applies only to large or high-revenue companies; (2) relies only on the FTC for enforcement; (3) does not conduct impact
assessment by relying on diverse stockholder input; and (4) does not give the public access to impact assessment outcomes. Id.
314
H.R. 6090; Diaz, supra note 303. Specifically, this legislation would establish the Artificial Intelligence Board to regulate and resolve matters arising
from the creation, development, and deployment of AI. Id.
315
Diaz, supra note 303 (citing a practitioner contending that the proposed tax
would “create panic” among companies and stressed that any proposal to monitor
AI should leave room for the innovation of companies and employers).
316
See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 393
(2016) (explaining that instead of giving the new agency broad powers to ban
products it believes to be unsafe, the proposal would “create a liability system
under which the designers, manufacturers, and sellers of agency-certified AI programs would be subject to limited tort liability, while uncertified programs that
are offered for commercial sale or use would be subject to strict joint and several
liability”).
317
See generally id. at 393–97.
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governmental certifying agency.318 Under this proposal, the thirdparty certification entity would be a multi-disciplinary team of auditors consisting of lawyers, software engineers, or data scientists.319
There are far more aggressive proposals at the state level. Most
notably, in 2022, the California Fair Employment and Housing
Council proposed sweeping modifications to the state’s employment
antidiscrimination laws that would significantly expand liability exposure for employers and third-party vendors that use, sell, or administer AI tools in connection with employment decision-making.320 The draft regulations seek to make unlawful the use of automated-decision systems that “screen out or tend to screen out” applicants or employees (or classes of applicants or employees) on the
basis of a characteristic protected by state law, unless shown to be
job-related and consistent with business necessity.321 These requirements would apply to employer and third-party decision-making
throughout the employment lifecycle.322 Importantly, the proposed
regulations apply not only to employers but also to “employment
agencies,” which could include vendors and administrators of AI
tools used for making employment decisions, if they are unlawfully
discriminatory.323 In other words, vendors that develop and sell AI
tools would be explicitly and directly liable if their automated-decision system screens out, or tends to screen out, an applicant or employee based on a protected characteristic.324 Moreover, California’s
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proposed regulations would create private causes of action for aiding and abetting when a third-party provides unlawful assistance,
unlawful solicitation or encouragement, or unlawful advertising
when that third-party advertises, sells, provides, or uses an automated-decision system that may result in unlawful discrimination.325 Finally, the draft regulations would expand recordkeeping
requirements from two years to four years, which practitioners have
described as excessively burdensome.326
B. Model Risk Management and AI
A growing number of experts have been pushing a model risk
management (“MRM”) framework for AI based on model governance derived from lessons learned from the financial services sector.327 An MRM framework essentially uses internal audits to ensure
that the application of AI in employment decisions complies with an
employer’s duty to comply with applicable antidiscrimination
laws.328 Experts argue that the process of these self-audits is so well
developed in the financial sector that non-financial industries and
businesses can look to the financial services approach for guidance
regarding appropriate regulatory standards and industry practices
that facilitate the lawful use of AI in employment decisions.329 Financial sector MRM regulatory guidance has been developed jointly
by the various federal financial regulators and international organizations concerned with financial stability.330 In other words, employers may look to the standards and best practices in the financial
325
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sector as a successful framework for developing their own effective
internal auditing processes.
Applying MRM concepts to AI employment technology provides a well-tread framework in an innovative application for managing the unique challenges that employers face when integrating
AI into their employment processes. As such, non-financial companies that use predictive models with potential for discrimination risk
can use the financial sector’s MRM principles and processes to
guide their own management of model risk, even though they are
not subject to the same regulatory requirements as financial institutions.331 Experts have emphasized that the processes to do so do not
need to be as elaborate as those required of financial institutions, but
the same principles may be applied effectively in the narrower context of controlling discrimination and other legal concerns.332
Scholars have noted that similar self-auditing is regularly used
and recommended in other industries, including the manufacturing
sector, because, if executed correctly, it helps companies comply
with the relevant legal requirements.333 One noteworthy example is
the self-audits used by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), whereby such self-audits are used to assess
workplace hazards, controls, and programs to help ensure that companies and their employees are complying with OSHA regulations.334 OSHA also allows businesses to hire a consultant to perform self-audits if OSHA is not able to do an inspection immediately.335 Another comparable self-audit program was DOL’s former
Payroll Audit Independent Determination (“PAID”) Program,
which encouraged employers to self-audit their compensation practices for compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.336 PAID

331

Id. at 358–59.
Id.
333
Age Discrimination, supra note 147, at 17.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
See Yvette Gatling et al., DOL Ends Payroll Audit Independent Determination (PAID) Program for Employers, LITTLER (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/dol-ends-payroll-audit-independent-determination-paid-program.
332

2022]

THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL

59

was intended to resolve wage and hour disputes with greater expediency and lower costs for employers.337 To do so, PAID incentivized employers to self-report overtime and minimum wage violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act by not only mitigating the
threat of penalties and extended statute of limitations, but also foreclosing affected workers from taking any private action based on the
identified violations.338 In exchange, the DOL would supervise settlements, approve agreements, and ensure full payment of back
wages.339
Currently, the federal government has moved toward a risk management framework. In the National Defense Authorization Act for
2021, Congress directed the Department of Commerce’s National
Institute of Standards and Technology to develop “a voluntary risk
management framework for trustworthy AI systems.”340 Later in
2021, the National Institute of Standards and Technology issued a
Request for Information seeking input to inform the development of
the AI Risk Management Framework.341 Practitioners have explained that this framework “may greatly influence how companies
and organizations approach AI-related risks, including avoiding bias
and promoting accuracy, privacy, and security.”342
While equipping MRM tools to AI will certainly require
thoughtful policy considerations such as what to include in a model
inventory, as well as determining risk tolerance, risk levels, and
roles and responsibilities, area experts note that existing frameworks
can serve as a useful starting point in this endeavor.343 Companies
developing and using machine learning and other predictive models
can design an effective system for MRM by ensuring that there is an
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appropriate level of model governance structure that provides mechanisms for identifying, evaluating, and eliminating any statistically
significant discrimination associated with the models.344
For these reasons, civil rights advocates, regulators, AI developers, and other stakeholders should look at the financial industry’s
MRM framework and identify concepts that can and should be applied more broadly. Employers and developers implementing AI
will be well-served by learning from the decade-old experience of
the financial industry and adopting the lessons learned from this experience.
C. Collection Efforts
Some commentators have pushed for increased collection of
data concerning ratings and employment outcomes among different
groups of workers as an important step to identify discrepancies
based on protected characteristics.345 Specifically, this would involve publishing data broken down by specific demographic categories to determine whether certain people are at a greater risk of
receiving low ratings from consumers or other negative performance
feedback in an algorithm because of protected bases.346 But data collection efforts are usually unhelpful and not useful. Collecting data
just for the sake of collecting data is simply not advantageous. Ultimately, raw data without proper context undermines any proposal to
increase collection efforts.347
Practitioners have strongly criticized the efficacy of data collection in preventing and remedying employment discrimination. Several studies commissioned by OFCCP have determined that “the
predictive ability of the data gathering to identify gender discrimination was ‘only slightly better than chance,’ resulting [in] both
false positives and false negatives.”348 Investigating these false pos-
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itives and false negatives will surely waste valuable EEOC and employer resources that should instead be spent on more targeted and
meaningful efforts. The EEOC’s own work study group tasked with
examining the concept of collecting pay data concluded that past
proposals were “quite burdensome,” “unbelievable,” and “scary.”349
In addition, the aggregated nature of the data collected renders
it difficult, if not impossible, in measuring, quantifying, and proving
discrimination claims.350 Practitioners have stressed the presence of
numerous factors that may impact employment decisions and for
which data collection cannot properly address.351
D. European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act
The European Union’s legislative proposal may also impact the
regulatory direction of the United States. American policymakers at
both the federal and state levels have shown a particular interest in
the proposed European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (“EU AI
Act”).352 The proposal’s risk-based approach to the regulation of AI
seeks to build trust in the technology by protecting fundamental
rights, ensuring public safety, and fostering innovation.353 To that
end, the proposal creates a four-level taxonomy of risk in AI: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal to no risk.354 AI used in employment, management of workers, and access to self-employment,
such as resume-sorting software utilized in recruitment procedures,
are classified as high-risk.355 The high-risk classification subjects
the AI systems to strict safeguards before they can be used by the
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public, including robust reporting, disclosure, validation, and accuracy requirements.356 Still, some critics of the European Union proposal contend that the requirement of certifying high-risk AI before
it is placed in the market might only result in high administrative
costs and may harm a company’s ability to innovate and improve.357
Other critics go even further and argue that compliance with the law
will impose onerous barriers for AI innovation in many sectors, deter investors and talent, create a very difficult environment for
startups to develop innovative AI services, and could push small and
medium-sized businesses out of the market.358
But perhaps most notable is that the proposed regulation would
primarily cover providers and vendors of AI systems—the entities
that develop the system and place it on the market or that develop
the system and put it to use for themselves.359 This is distinguishable
from the current legal framework in the United States, where generally employers—not vendors—are usually solely liable for employment discrimination.360 This movement toward increased focus on
vendor liability is important, especially in light of the European
356
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Commission’s Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies’
report Liability for Artificial Intelligence, that concluded that “inadequacies in a system of liability might ‘compromise the expected
benefits’ of such a technology.”361 Regardless, if the EU AI Act is
adopted, it will undoubtedly have a significant impact on companies
doing business in the European Union that rely on AI in any aspect
of their business.
V. A DEREGULATORY APPROACH TO AI
In the absence of an overarching federal legislative or regulatory
solution, a deregulatory approach can, and indeed should, be utilized. This deregulatory approach must account for the benefits of
the technology, the related risks, and possible barriers to innovation.
Fundamentally, the current law is sufficient to support effective enforcement on AI systems when necessary. A recent comprehensive
study suggests that policymakers can address most of AI’s “legal
and societal challenges by adapting regulations already in the
books.”362 This systematic study concluded that “despite AI’s incredible capabilities, major changes to policy paradigms are not required” to address the risks.363
Even if a legislative proposal were adopted, the EEOC and other
agencies’ work would not end there. Relatedly, any regulatory proposal would take time to implement, so the existing framework is an
important consideration. Likewise, the legislative process is often
described as notoriously tedious and reactionary which makes it difficult for legislation to keep pace with emerging technologies.364 For
these reasons, this Part examines the legal mechanisms that can help
reduce the risks associated with AI, reduce uncertainty, and protect
employees without inhibiting innovation.
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A. Use Existing Legal Framework
Even though some of the laws the EEOC enforces are over half
a century old, by their terms, they “apply with equal force to decisions made by algorithms as they do to decisions made by individuals.”365 The EEOC is readily adapting to the massive growth of AI
and its intersection with employment discrimination law. For example, in 2021, the EEOC’s systemic investigators received training on
using AI in employment practices.366
In addition, legal scholars have emphasized that “employment
antidiscrimination law imposes an affirmative duty of care on employers to ensure that they are avoiding practices that would constrain equal opportunity in employment.”367 This affirmative duty
could extend to an auditing imperative for certain AI tools such as
video interviews. Scholars have noted that Title VII, in particular,
“could be read to directly prohibit classification bias when algorithms operate to systematically disadvantage protected groups.”368
Fully exploring specific solutions to each phase of AI and each
type of technology is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few
examples are illustrative. An algorithm that discerns an applicant’s
physical or mental disability may violate the ADA’s prohibition
against medical inquiries or exams in pre-employment assessments.369 Likewise, AI technology that is operated by voice recognition and analysis that screens out an individual with a speech impediment or an individual with a hearing impairment would likely
violate the ADA.370 AI technology that operates by voice commands
or voice analysis that screens out individuals who do not speak English as their first language may contravene Title VII’s prohibition
365
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against national origin discrimination.371 Advertisements for positions within its company that limit the audience for their advertisement to younger applicants would likely run afoul of the ADEA, a
statute that expressly prohibits job advertisements that indicate an
age preference.372 Likewise, online automated hiring platforms that
include design features that discourage older applicants would also
contravene the ADEA. These are only a few of the examples of the
potential discriminatory impact of AI applications in employee hiring.
Courts are well-equipped to deal with the complexities of reconciling new AI technology with long-established legal principles.
ADA Title III website and mobile app accessibility litigation is instructive and demonstrates that courts can account for changes in
technology in discrimination suits.373 The ADA was passed in 1990,
well before the modern internet became ubiquitous, and few ever
considered how it might need to be interpreted to account for the
explosive growth of digital content.374 But over the past decade,
courts have increasingly adjudicated lawsuits filed by individuals
with disabilities claiming that businesses’ websites and mobile apps
were not accessible to them, and the courts have applied the
longstanding antidiscrimination law to resolve these modern disputes.375 For instance, one federal district court explained that excluding certain online retailers and their commercial websites from
the reach of Title III “would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA
and would severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with
disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general
public.”376 In addition, the courts have significant expertise with the
371
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bedrock principles of contract, tort, product liability, and other areas
of the law requiring the allocation of responsibility and fault.
While multiple entities are engaged in the development and implementation of AI products that may cause discriminatory harm,
the courts are fully capable of allocating liability among several potential defendants.377 As in many other contexts unrelated to technological advances, the judicial system will serve an important role in
providing an indirect form of regulation through the development of
legal standards, a body of case law, and subsequent deterrence.
However, the chief problem with relying on the existing legal
framework is that the protection provided by the courts is remedial,
not preventative. To that end, courts assess liability and damages for
activity that has already transpired based on prior legal precedent.
Accordingly, proactive measures, such as more guidance and other
agency-available resources, must also be considered in order to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place.
B. EEOC Commissioner Charges and Directed Investigations
Going forward, the EEOC should consider using Commissioner
charges and directed investigations to address AI-related employment discrimination. Both tools are rarely used by the Commission,
even though they facilitate and may expedite the initiation of targeted bias probes.378 Congress granted the EEOC authority to investigate possible discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, and GINA
using Commissioner charges.379 Congress also authorized the
EEOC to investigate possible age discrimination under the ADEA
and possible pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act through
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“directed investigations.”380 Directed investigations are unique, because the EEOC can initiate these investigations without an underlying charge from an identifiable victim.381
An EEOC Commissioner charge or directed investigation most
often arises in one of three ways. The first way is when a field office
learns about possible discrimination in a workplace in the absence
of a charge through “direct observation, from local community leaders, advocacy groups, and [state level] partners, or through the sharing of information between the EEOC and [DOJ], Labor, and other
federal agencies.”382 The second way is when a field office learns
about “new allegations of discrimination while investigating an existing charge and is not able to expand the existing charge to address
the new allegation(s).”383 The third way is when a Commissioner
learns about discrimination in a workplace and executes a charge,
which a field office then investigates.384
Commissioner charges are useful for identifying and remedying
possible systemic or pattern-or-practice discrimination rather than
single plaintiff discrimination because they are initiated from a
broader enforcement perspective than that possessed or can as readily be remedied by the allegations of a single party.385 Furthermore,
new HR technologies raise special concerns of systemic discrimination, particularly when these new technologies are implemented at
all stages of the hiring process. Some AI groups have argued that
because the EEOC has not acted upon a single complaint involving
the use of new hiring technologies, a more proactive approach involving the use of Commissioner charges is necessary.386
29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (2018) (stating that the EEOC “shall have the power to
make investigations”); 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2018) (specifying that EEOC “may
investigate and gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and
practices of employment in any industry subject to this chapter”).
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Commissioner charges often increase the scope and complexity
of an investigation for those responding to and defending against
them while raising the financial stake.387 For the EEOC, Commissioner charges that reach the litigation stage “may involve a major
expenditure of agency resources, including staffing and staff time,
and/or expenses associated with extensive discovery or expert witnesses.”388 Practitioners have explained that “given their public interest and class-based nature, [C]ommissioner charges are the very
kind that the EEOC may be inclined to pursue in litigation if after
an investigation reasonable cause is found and a settlement ‘acceptable to the commission’ cannot be reached.”389 Not surprisingly,
some EEOC Commissioners have shown interest in investigating AI
employment discrimination via Commissioner charges.390
Notably, filing charges can oftentimes be difficult for job applicants because they usually lack basic information about any discriminatory hiring policy or practice.391 When AI is involved in the hiring process, Commissioner charges could be especially helpful, because the victims of employment discrimination are oftentimes unaware that they have been discriminated against. For instance, targeted online job advertisements are often opaque and the targeting
is usually not fully explainable.392 Those in the excluded group
likely will never see the job advertisement at all and therefore will
be unable to ask why they are not seeing the particular job posting.393
Although they do not know of the existence of the advertisement,
they arguably have suffered a tangible harm by being denied information about job opportunities.394 An EEOC Commissioner charge
or directed investigation could potentially uncover and root out
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these discriminatory actions. The EEOC’s then-Chair, Janet Dhillon, commented that “Commissioner charges and directed investigations are important tools in the Commission’s arsenal to fight employment discrimination, and it is vital that the public knows how
we use them.”395
C. Federal Agencies Should Promote Voluntary Compliance
Programs
Federal agencies such as the EEOC should encourage and incentivize companies to create voluntary compliance programs. A voluntary compliance program would allow employers to ensure—on
their own—that they comply with their legal and ethical obligations,
provided the Commission clearly established methods, levels, and
results that, in its view, complied with legal requirements. Employers should be strongly encouraged to audit their algorithms by refining or discarding biased models to mitigate discriminatory effects.396 If an algorithm is one aspect of a selection process, federal
agencies should incentivize employers to ensure their selection processes are unbiased, even though it may be unclear which factors in
the algorithm may cause a disparate impact.397 To achieve this end,
employers should be given a degree of protection if they act in good
faith to evaluate their HR processes for potential bias and take steps
to remove that bias or error.398 One scholar advocating for such an
approach explains that “[a]nti-discrimination law will not achieve
its purposes if it gives employers an incentive to bury their heads in
the sand and avoid finding out the effects of their practices.”399
At the end of the day, government efforts to help employers voluntarily comply with these obligations will help prevent unlawful
discrimination and is undoubtedly part of the EEOC’s statutory mission.400 Moreover, Title VII, which created the EEOC, specifically
395
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emphasizes pre-suit voluntary compliance.401 After receiving a complaint, Title VII provides that the EEOC “shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”402 In 2020, the
EEOC introduced two mediation pilot programs dedicated to increasing voluntary resolutions, thereby demonstrating that the
EEOC’s appetite for voluntary compliance remains high.403
Moreover, the voluntary compliance remains a critical component of federal antidiscrimination law.404 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that employer compliance, including by
non-litigation means, is “the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII” and “essential to the statutory scheme.”405 The
Supreme Court has strongly cautioned that unless employers can act
to avoid practices that have a disparate impact, the voluntary compliance efforts that Title VII calls for would come “to a near standstill.”406
D. Federal Agencies Should Provide More Guidance
Federal agencies, especially the EEOC, should prioritize issuing
more AI guidance to the public. Guidance that better clarifies how
to tailor and test AI platforms and workplace technologies is especially important for employers and vendors to ensure that they comply with federal antidiscrimination laws and, conversely, understand
failures and circumstances that are likely to lead to liability. This is
especially important because the current legal landscape does not
provide employers with clear answers in the form of regulations or
guidance.407 Indeed, practitioners regularly claim that government
agencies have provided little direction regarding ways that they may
ensure compliance with federal law, compelling employers to guess
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group”
of employees).
401
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regarding ways in which courts will apply longstanding principles
in new or novel settings.408 In most cases, the employer would much
prefer to tailor technology to align with the law, thus avoiding not
only the uncertainty and risk of liability, but also the potentially
greater cost of litigation.409 Government-led enforcement actions or
litigation against those who are using AI technologies, while the federal agencies responsible for administering the laws have said nothing, is wrong and short-sighted.410
One EEOC Commissioner has stressed that the Commission
needs to make it a “priority to clarify how federal antidiscrimination
law applies to technologies that are transforming not only the way
we work but the way we manage workers.”411 He noted that “preventing employment discrimination from occurring in the first place
is preferable to remedying the consequences of discrimination” and
“that most employers want to do the right thing” but “they just need
the tools to comply” which is especially true with the use of AI in
employment decision-making.412
The administrative law process, particularly through the submission of public comments, can surely help improve the guidance by
providing outside parties the opportunity to provide meaningful
feedback, including pivotal responses from industry experts. Consistent application of legal principles is an essential feature for effective guidance. Given the relative infancy of these issues, it is axiomatic that guidance is most effective when employees and employers may rely on it. Rules and other subregulatory guidance that
oscillates from one presidential administration or Congress to the
next is of minimal utility in this context. Ultimately, clear, comprehensive, and reasonable guidance that is enforced predictably and
consistently will help encourage technology vendors and employers
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to proactively prevent discriminatory effects. Likewise, such guidance will reduce uncertainty and protect workers, employees, applicants, and others without inhibiting innovation.
One way the EEOC may proceed is by issuing opinion letters
tailored to questions and issues confronting employees and employers. In brief, an opinion letter is an official written opinion from an
agency on how a statute, its implementing regulations, and related
case law apply to a specific situation presented by the person or entity requesting the opinion.413 For more than seventy years, opinion
letters have proven to be a valuable resource for courts, employers,
employees, unions, trade groups, practitioners, advocacy groups,
and the general public.414 The Department of Labor’s Wage and
Hour Division (“WHD”) is probably the most well-known agency
for issuing opinion letters, but other federal agencies also issue opinion letters, including the EEOC and OFCCP.415 Opinion letters
could be particularly useful in the AI arena. Just as WHD has long
used opinion letters to clarify the application of depression-era wage
requirements to modern economic situations, so too the EEOC may
do the same with federal antidiscrimination law. Indeed, some of
WHD’s opinion letters have specifically addressed workplace technology in recent years, including one on a virtual marketplace company and another regarding an employer’s use of rounding software.416
Employers, vendors, employees, applicants, and others could
submit opinion letter requests to the EEOC seeking answers to a
wide variety of critical AI questions. In particular, opinion letters
could be used to clarify the law relating to each type of AI technol-
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ogy being used in employment decisions, including voice recognition, facial recognition, and resume screening. For example, an
opinion letter request could seek clarity regarding undue hardship
under the ADA if AI is being used in a video interview platform. By
examining relevant factors such as how the AI is being used, the
complexity of the AI, and alternative options available, the EEOC
can provide specific examples of acceptable reasonable accommodations, ranging from modified technology use to interviewing in
person.
Because of the expected increase of AI laws at the state level,
state labor and employment agencies should also consider issuing
opinion letters to answer critical questions about the use of AI under
these state laws.417 This resource would be particularly important
with vague AI state and local laws such as the Illinois Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act and New York City’s AI law. In
summary, opinion letters could provide an avenue for meaningful
guidance without creating entirely new laws.
VI. BEST PRACTICES
With the rapid funding, development, and implementation of AI
in the workplace, employers can expect the wave of workplace AI
tools to continue. Now is a critical time for employers to take proactive mitigation measures to avoid harmful practices that automate
discriminatory practices, resulting in front-page news stories.418 To
protect themselves against government enforcement actions and litigation, employers and their HR professionals must now adopt best
practices for using AI in hiring and employment decisions.
Even in the absence of an AI-specific regulatory framework, this
Part discusses some of the most important best practices to guide
employers in implementing and maintaining effective AI tools that
fully comply with federal employment antidiscrimination laws. A
417
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substantive discussion of state, local, and international requirements
is beyond this Part’s scope. Whether employers rely on algorithms,
human HR professionals, or both, it is imperative that they develop
and implement policies and corporate oversight designed to identify
and address more nuanced employment decisions. These best practices are designed to be a starting point for companies to prevent AI
bias in practice. Companies that develop and use AI should be forward-thinking as they evaluate and address potential AI risks.
A. Determine Whether AI is Being Used for Employment
Purposes
As a threshold matter, employers should assess whether AI is
already being used in employment decision-making.419 Although
this task may seem elemental, for many employers it is deceptively
complex. Indeed, many employers are unaware that some of their
basic employment tools constitute, or rely upon, AI technology.420
Employers may be inclined to focus on whether they use AI during
the hiring process. However, they should carefully assess whether
they use AI for additional purposes and decisions throughout the
employment cycle.421 For example, employers may use an AI tool
to monitor employees and track performance.422 The data collected
during this process may contribute to employment decisions concerning promotions, demotions, bonuses, termination, and related
areas.423 If an AI tool is used in this manner, it would likely be considered as making an actionable employment decision under the
law.424 Recognizing whether AI is used for employment purposes is
important as a threshold issue because of the increasing number of
laws governing the use of AI. Employers with multi-state operations
must keep apprised of differences between state and local laws that
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may define and regulate AI tools as well as employment decisions
differently.425
B. Companies Should Know their Data
Employment-related predictions are only as accurate as the data
being analyzed.426 Thus, it is imperative that companies be vigilant
about developing, applying, and modifying the data that is utilized
to train and run the recruiting programs and algorithms used to
screen and evaluate potential candidates and applicants.427 This is
because data that is incomplete, has errors, or has biases will negatively impact the AI tool’s machine learning as well as the correlating data-driven decision-making outcomes.428 As a result, the data
should be as complete as possible with no missing or unreliable factors, fit the questions needing answers, and be voluminous enough
to provide statistically relevant results.429 Additionally, those using
AI for employment decision-making should avoid potentially biased
data from sources such as social media and from data brokers because it could be potentially error-prone and biased.430
A useful way to ensure that employers know their data is to ask
their vendors about the technology being used. One practitioner emphasizes that helpful questions could include asking about the types
of data that are collected; whether any types of data collected are
irrelevant to the purpose of the software; whether the data is securely
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stored and how long it is stored.431 Other helpful inquires could include asking about how the algorithms accomplish their purposes
and whether they are reliable; whether the algorithms have been audited for potential biases; whether the companies are transparent
about how their technologies work; and whether the technology has
been designed with the needs of various users in mind.432
Understanding the substance and origin of data used to train and
operate the AI will remain of paramount importance in the years
ahead. Government agencies and plaintiffs will increasingly attempt
to argue that AI technology produced discriminatory disparate results, relying on potentially complicated statistical analysis.433 Government enforcers and attorneys will also seek to discredit the data
sets used to fuel the algorithms, where they appear incomplete or
otherwise deficient.434 As a result, employers will need to exercise
vigilance in determining whether the data genuinely supports the decisions made on the basis of the algorithms.435 Employers cannot
adopt a “set-it-and-forget-it” approach to HR technologies because
inaccurate, incomplete, or unrepresentative data tends to amplify,
rather than minimize, bias in decision-making. Employers will
likely be called on to explain the connection and path between the
data and the challenged decision or outcome. If employers do not
understand their data, they will not be able to defend the decision,
including when demonstrating job-relatedness and business necessity.
Another important component of managing AI is ensuring the
responsible collection, organization, handling, and storage of data.
Because AI tools may collect information about legally protected
characteristics, companies must ensure it is stored securely, maintained only as long as necessary, and destroyed when appropriate.436
431
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Practitioners advise that access to this information should be limited
to only those employees with a need to know, and that the information should not be shared with third-parties without a valid reason
or employee consent.437
C. Transparency and Explainability
Transparency and explainability are two very important concepts that foster algorithmic reliability, trust, credibility, and a general understanding of AI systems.438 Transparency promotes the visibility of processes, the accessibility of systems, and the reporting of
meaningful information.439 Explainability fosters trust in the process.440 Neither is possible, though, if the user of the AI does not
first understand the data on which it relies. And a lack of either or
both can result in algorithmic systems that are difficult to control,
monitor, correct, and defend.441 This is the commonly cited “black
box” issue.442 In a similar vein, the absence of transparency, accountability, and understandability threatens to undermine any benefits offered by AI and machine learning technologies.
Employers should explore efforts to promote transparency and
explainability surrounding their use of AI in employment decisions
as the fruits of the technology and the underlying problems posed
by innovation continue to develop.443 To do so, they should aim to
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provide meaningful information appropriate to the context. Specifically, employers should inform applicants about what data is used
and how it is used in the hiring process.444
Transparency and explainability also empower those affected by
an AI system to understand the outcome. They enable those adversely affected by an AI system to challenge its outcome based on
plain and easy-to-understand information on the factors and the
logic that served as the basis for the prediction, recommendation, or
decision. In the same vein, employers should define and assign roles
to their HR professionals that ensures HR and management understand their responsibilities in relation to the company’s use of AI in
employment decision-making.445 Actively pursuing transparent and
explainable applications of AI fosters trust among employers seeking to prudently and lawfully implement this technology as well as
job applicants and employees who are subject to it.446
Transparency and explainability require open, detailed, and
clear communication. Employers should provide applicants and employees with robust notice that explains, at a minimum, what technologies are being used, for what purpose, how they work, the specific information that is collected, to whom it will be disclosed, how
it will be used, and how long it will be retained.447 Employers should
also explain how access to any information collected will be controlled and any other safeguards for the information. Notices for AI
technology involved with employee performance should also include these details, while also explaining anticipated benefits to the
employees such as ways it will enhance their performance or make
their work easier to accomplish. Ultimately, effective notice will allow candidates and employees to make informed choices about
whether to participate in the activity, and whether to seek a reasonable accommodation or alternative arrangement.448

444

See Daming, supra note 119.
See id. See also Matissa Hollister, How to Keep the “Human” in Human
Resources with AI-Based Tools, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 21, 2021)
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/12/how-to-keep-human-in-human-resources-with-ai-based-tools/.
446
See id.; see also Daming, supra note 119.
447
See Daming, supra note 119.
448
See Blackman & Ammanath, supra note 438; see also Daming, supra note
119.
445

2022]

THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL

79

Employers should have ample flexibility with providing notice.
For example, they could put a standard notice in job advertisements
or include a notice in their online application platforms. Another option would be for employers to publish a separate notice or policy
which may be easier. However, the risk with a separate notice is that
not all applicants will see it.
D. Monitor and Audit AI Uses and Processes
Companies must regularly study AI outcomes and do their best
to monitor their AI uses and processes to detect any discriminatory
outcomes over time.449 Where appropriate, employers should adjust
data and inputs utilized by the recruiting and hiring programs and
algorithms to avoid or ameliorate improper results.450 In so doing,
employers may better understand which factors are actually job-related, which is a linchpin criterion under many employment laws,
and to institute modifications aimed at minimizing the potential for
bias.451 Employers using externally developed AI need to take affirmative measures to understand the developers’ mechanisms for
eliminating bias and assess whether their AI has a disparate impact
on any class protected by federal antidiscrimination laws.452 It is not
enough to rely wholesale on third-party methodology, nor to point
to the third-party’s reluctance to disclose its “proprietary systems”
for ensuring there is no unlawful bias.453 This is especially true
where the vendor uses the employer’s own historical data to train
the algorithm.
Employers should also highly consider a more extensive audit
of their AI tools on a regular basis to assess the impact that AI, automated decision-making, and other algorithmic tools have on human beings. Some experts recommend conducting an audit once a
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year while others emphasize that audits should be continuous.454 Audits may need to be conducted more frequently when the AI tools
are first deployed and thereafter. While there is no uniform approach, experts stress that the audits should be both qualitative and
quantitative.455 Audits are especially critical in ensuring that programs are not inadvertently “learning” the wrong lessons from the
information entered into the systems.456 Based on the audits, the employers can adjust the data input and decision rules to improve outcomes. Practitioners have noted that self-critical analysis of both the
inputs and outputs is essential to minimize liability risk under the
employment laws.457 Examining inputs and outputs through an audit
can be used to determine when an AI tool systematically discriminates against particular groups and is also particularly useful in detecting patterns.458
Addressing the scope of how confidentiality (including the potential application of the attorney-client privilege) might apply to
these audits falls outside the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is
clear that employers who use AI for employment-related decisionmaking will be seen by the courts as having at least a baseline duty
to demonstrate (i.e., disclose) the measures employed to ensure that
they understand, monitor, and audit their algorithms to detect potentially unlawful outcomes that disadvantage protected groups. Consequently, companies should strive to maintain a record of actions
taken to mitigate potential bias and harms from AI systems which
could later be critical in a lawsuit or response to a regulatory or enforcement proceeding.459 Similarly, employers are encouraged to
consider memorializing the results of audits in writing.460 This creates documented evidence that the employer is making a good-faith
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effort to comply with equal employment opportunity laws, understands the impact of AI, and is continually working to improve.461
E. Role of Human Oversight and Intervention When
Necessary
Employers using AI for employment decision-making should remember that AI is not a panacea for all employment challenges; personal human intervention must continue to play fundamental and
critical roles in employment decisions.462 Employers should charge
a person (or team of people) with overseeing the processes and results of AI tools to ensure that they are not only performing their
legitimate objectives, but also avoiding improper outcomes such as
eliminating potential candidates who may require accommodation
to perform essential job functions. When employers randomly manually screen at least some percentage of job applications in addition
to their AI filter, their selection process will likely be more individualized, more unbiased, and reduce the risk of unwanted discrimination and litigation.463 Employers should be encouraged to develop
some general guidelines about what HR professionals should be doing to make the process more robust and trustworthy.
The importance of human involvement with AI tools has been
evidenced by recent litigation. For example, in 2019, Facebook settled a class action lawsuit alleging that the company failed to prevent
employment, housing, and credit advertising discrimination based
on protected bases, including race, age, and gender.464 The settlement agreement directed Facebook to establish a system of reviewing job advertisements that incorporated automated and human review.465
In addition, burgeoning reports of aggressive productivity targets underscores the need for employers to find the right division of
labor between AI and HR personnel; in other words, finding the best
461
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path between using AI to improve human decision-making and delegating decision-making entirely to algorithms.466 The EEOC has
accentuated that when managers make employment decisions based
on subjective judgment, a best practice that enables employers to
avoid discriminatory decision-making is to provide training to inexperienced managers and encourage them to consult with more experienced managers or HR personnel when addressing complex or difficult issues.467
Furthermore, companies should understand that compliance
with federal antidiscrimination law often requires human intervention, especially when workplace accommodations for disabled and
religious employees are at issue.468 Simple, as well as sophisticated,
algorithms may not have the essential sensitivity to respond to employees who need reasonable accommodations. Employers that use
AI for performance management, such as tracking productivity,
should ensure their AI program accounts for accommodations based
on disability as well as religious observance and practice.469 It is especially important for employers to inform their employees that the
ADA and Title VII still require an interactive process to determine
the reasonable accommodations when an employer uses AI for performance management.470
The EEOC’s veterans discrimination guidance issued in late
2020 underscores the important role of human intervention in the
accommodation context.471 In response to a question about whether
an employer can ask a veteran with a disability whether a reasonable
accommodation is needed if none has been requested, the EEOC explains that if an employer reasonably believes that a veteran with an
466
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obvious service-connected disability, such as a veteran who is blind
or missing a limb, “who is applying for a particular job will need a
reasonable accommodation to do that job, the employer may ask
whether an accommodation is needed and, if so, what type.”472 The
EEOC’s guidance further explains that an employer may ask a veteran with a disability whether the individual needs an accommodation once they started working when it is apparent that the veteran
is facing challenges on the job because of the disability.473 Importantly, the EEOC’s guidance stresses that “it may be critical for
the employer to initiate a conversation with a veteran who is experiencing problems to determine an appropriate accommodation”
since many veterans may not ask for a reasonable accommodation
because they do not consider their service-related injuries to be disabilities, and they do not know they have a legal right to ask for an
accommodation.474 The EEOC’s response emphasizes that by
“[w]orking together, the employer and veteran should identify what
the veteran cannot do and then discuss ways to address any identified performance issue(s).”475 The guidance thus underscores the essential role human intervention continues to play in the accommodation process.
Human intervention involving reasonable accommodations may
be especially necessary and useful during the interview process.
More employers are using AI to conduct interviews by asking applicants to electronically record their answers to questions. The AI program subsequently analyzes the recording to identify predictors of
the applicant’s qualifications and anticipated success in the job.476
These predictors may include “key words, the speed of speech, [and]
body language.”477 Since some AI programs are unable to account
for reasonable accommodations, employers should be prepared to
conduct in-person interviews for applicants with disabilities such as

472
473
474
475
476
477

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Meneghello et al., supra note 462.
Id.

84

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

assisting those with visual or hearing impairments.478 In order to ensure this process occurs, the screening algorithms should include
mechanisms designed to account for applicants who present with
disabilities and “flag” such applicants for human interviews. Furthermore, practitioners have noted that employers that use computer-based tests to evaluate applicants should consider providing
alternative test formats to accommodate individuals with disabilities.479
Disability and religious accommodation requests will continue
to be a challenging area for employers, especially as the technology
improves and becomes more affordable.480 Practitioners have
stressed that employers should be fully prepared to respond and appropriately engage in a cooperative dialogue about any accommodation requests.481 For the foreseeable future, AI is unlikely to offer
an adequate substitute for this inherently dynamic process, for which
human intervention continues to be essential.
F. Understand Vendor Liability
Many companies enlist the help of outside vendors to support
their HR functions, such as screening applicants and advertising to
job seekers.482 As an initial matter, employers should carefully review and negotiate any contracts they have with vendors providing
these services.483 It is especially important for companies who purchase AI hiring tools to ensure that vendors attest to the fairness and
integrity of the product while negotiating the proper indemnification
clauses that anticipate potential government investigation.484
478
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Equally important, employers should be mindful that they could be
held liable if the vendors discriminate against candidates based on
protected characteristics while using AI tools.485 As a result, practitioners have stressed that employers should include clear language
in their contracts with vendors that requires vendors to abide by all
employment laws related to the screening and hiring of job candidates.486
In addition, employers should also press AI vendors for details
about how they test for disparate impact discrimination. Helpful
questions might include: What type of statistical analyses are performed to test for disparate impact? How were these methods chosen? Why are the chosen methods the right fit in this case? What
were the results of the analyses? Does the vendor re-test for disparate impact as training data changes or grows? Attention should also
be given to contractual language in forms supplied by the vendor
that purport to make general representations in this regard while also
including an indemnity clause that shifts all employment law risk
away from the vendor and onto the employer.487
G. Awareness of AI Legislation
Employers should be mindful of the risks involved with using
AI in employment decisions and ensure they comply with the
emerging patchwork of federal, state, and local laws regulating their
use. Because of the rapidly evolving legal landscape, employers
should closely monitor legislative and regulatory developments addressing the use of AI for employment decisions as well as relevant
decisions in the state and federal courts.488 Employers that have already implemented or that may implement AI tools in the workplace
should consider all applicable laws and recommended best practices
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to ensure compliance, which one recent survey suggests is not happening at a fast enough pace.489 In addition to federal laws governing
employers’ responsibilities with respect to AI tools, employers
should be aware of additional obligations and potential liability that
may be imposed by state or local laws governing AI technologies.
Indeed, state laws are particularly important because additional requirements are often mandated; for instance, a growing number of
state laws trigger notice, disclosure, and informed consent considerations.490 Employers should be especially mindful of compliance
with state law because the list of states with laws applicable to employment decisions and AI is increasing at a rapid rate.491 Employers
should be aware of these changes domestically, as well as internationally, since many countries are beginning to develop new laws
and regulations surrounding the implementation of AI into workplaces. The status quo mandates that employers and their compliance counsel remain especially attentive to current and developing
legal authority.492
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, employers will be required to grapple with a multitude of challenges involving AI in the workplace, especially as AI
tools become more mainstream. Because of the myriad benefits and
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unique challenges that arise with AI, novel solutions will need to be
considered to address them. In the coming years, AI and automation
in employment decision-making will lead to potentially more regulatory and legislative responses to the use of AI in the workplace. It
is imperative to avoid regulations that are ineffective or unduly hinder research and development. In the meantime, courts and regulatory agencies will increasingly attempt to apply well-established labor and employment laws to virtual workplaces. At the end of the
day, employers that stay informed, regularly analyze their data, and
monitor the use of that data will be well-positioned to avoid litigation and enforcement actions, while remaining at the forefront of
innovation.
The most effective solution is a deregulatory approach that
properly utilizes the existing employment discrimination framework
and the resources already available to agencies. Existing legal mechanisms that can help reduce the risks associated with AI should be
prioritized without stifling innovation, even in the face of AI’s distinct challenges. To this end, self-regulation and self-audits should
be encouraged and incentivized. The public, including legislators,
must be aware that regulators lack the requisite knowledge to fully
understand the problem that needs regulating.

